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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(J)(1996). 
Did the trial court error in granting defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds 
that plaintiffs had failed to give adequate notice under the Governmental Immunity Act. 
This issue was preserved by virtue of the motion, memoranda, and order of dismissal on 
the issue. (R. 20, 22, 32, 83, and 166). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court's grant of a dismissal for failure to comply with the notice 
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act is a conclusion of law which is reviewed 
for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's decision. Rushton v. Salt Lake 
County, 1999 UT 36, ^ 17, 977 P.2d 1201: Larson v. Park Citv Mun. Corp.. 955 P.2d 343, 
345 (Utah 1998). See also Brittain v. State. 882 P.2d 666, 668 (Utah App. 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 and 63-30-13 are implicated in this matter and 
therefore are reproduced in their entirety in Addendum A to this brief. 
The following cases have previously addressed this issue in Utah and must be 
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considered in ths present appeal. Rushton v. Salt Lake County. 1999 UT 36, ^ 17, 977 
P.2d 1201; Moreno v. Board of Educ. of Jordan School Dist.. 926 P.2d 886 (Utah 1996); 
Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority. 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980); Scarborough v. Granite 
School Dist. 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975); Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp. 911 P.2d 1294, 
1297 (Utah App. 1996); Bischel y. Merritt. 907 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1995); Brittan v. 
State. 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1994). Copies of these cases are attached hereto in 
Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action arises out of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on September 
27, 1998.] (R. 1). The accident occurred in Kane County, bul the lawsuit was transferred 
to Washington County because the defendant Mark McPherson was an employee of Kane 
County and Kane County was a named party. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that 
McPherson operated his motor vehicle into a motor vehicle being driven by Dale 
Wheeler, the husband of the plaintiff Mary Wheeler. Mrs. Wheeler and Ms. Srbova were 
occupants of Mr. Wheeler's vehicle. Plaintiffs complained that defendant McPherson 
failed to maintain proper control of his vehicle, failed to maintain a proper lookout and 
failed to yield to on-coming traffic and was otherwise negligent. 
As a result of the accident, plaintiffs claimed to have incurred special damages 
]For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, this court must take the allegations of 
plaintiffs complaint as true. Hannon City, Inc. v. Nielsen & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162, 1167 
(Utah 1995). 
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including medical expenses in excess of $3,000.00, as well as loss of income. Plaintiffs 
also pled for general damages. Plaintiffs maintained that as a direct approximate result of 
the defendants' negligence that defendants caused plaintiffs permanent impairment, 
permanent disability and loss of earning capacity. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant 
McPherson was at all relevant times an agent and employee of Kane County acting in the 
scope of that agency and employment. 
Prior to the complaint being filed September 27, 1999, Plaintiffs had filed a notice 
of claim with the Kane County Board of Commissioners by sending a notice on February 
11, 1999, to each and every commissioner individually, as well as to the insurance carrier 
which insured Kane County.2 See notices of claim attached in Addendum C (R. 64-69). 
Thus, the notices of claim were submitted to the governing body of Kane County less than 
five months after the accident occurred and seven months prior to any required notice of 
claim being required. The notices were sent to the Kane County offices and received by 
the county clerk's office. Holly Ramsay, an employee of the Kane County Clerk's office, 
signed for the certified notices. (R. 71-72). Later, Ms. Ramsay would file the only 
affidavit in support of defendants' motion stating that no notices were "filed" with the 
Kane County Clerk. The affidavit does not state that no notices were delivered to the 
2Prior to 1998, the proper persons upon whom a notice of claim could be served 
were the County Commissioners, as the governing body of Kane County. Yates v. Vernal 
Family Health Ctr.. 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980). Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 was amended 
and the amendment became effective in May of 1998. Section 63-30-13 still requires 
notice to be filed "with the governing body," according to the requirements of §63-30-11. 
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Kane County Clerk's office, as Ms. Ramsay's signature on the return slips would clearly 
rebut such an assertion. 
Subsequent to the notices of claim being submitted, a Kane County commissioner 
contacted plaintiffs' counsel and discussed the submission of the notices of claim and 
asked particularly concerning the demands of plaintiffs. Mr. Peatross, plaintiffs' attorney, 
indicated that the matter should be submitted to Kane County's insurance carrier. .See 
Affidavit of Mr. Peatross R. 58). In a letter dated March 8, 1999, an attorney who had 
been retained by Kane County, Ms. Hutton, acknowledged receipt of the notices of claim 
and requested further information regarding plaintiffs' injuries and submitted to plaintiff 
a consent to release medical information. The letter did note: "Please be advised this does 
not constitute an acceptance or denial of the 'notice of claim,' nor does it confirm or 
verify the sufficiency of the claimants' notice of claim as required by the governmental 
immunity act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq.".See letter of Ms. Hutton attached hereto 
as Addendum D. 
In a subsequent letter of March 20, 1999, Collin R. Winchester, the Kane County 
Attorney, wrote Mr. Peatross and indicated the claim had been turned over to adjusters 
who had in turn retained Ms. Hutton. The March 20, 1999 letter indicated: "Please direct 
all other communication and correspondence to Ms. Hutton." See attached letter attached 
as Addendum E. All communication with Kane County from that time forward was 
directed to Ms. Hutton per Kane County Attorney Winchester's request. (R. 60). 
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Course of Proceedings. Plaintiffs filed their complaint on September 27, 1999, 
one day before any notice of claim would have been required. Plaintiffs complaint was 
answered by Kane County. Defendant then served upon Plaintiffs a set of interrogatories, 
after which six subpoenas for medical records, as well as corresponding notices of 
records depositions were served upon defendant. 
On March 16, 2000, defendants filed a motion to dismiss upon the basis that the 
trial court lacked jurisdiction as the plaintiff had failed to comply with the requirements 
of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (3)(b)(ii)(B)( 1998). The motion was supported by the 
affidavit of Holly Ramsay. Defendants filed a memorandum in support of the motion to 
dismiss (R. 22). In opposition, Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to the 
motion (R. 32), as well as a Rule 56 (f) affidavit seeking further discovery (R. 30). 
Defendants thereafter responded with a reply memorandum (R.87), as well as a 
memorandum in opposition to rule 56 (f) affidavit. (R.83). 
A hearing was held on this matter August 10, 2000, whereupon the court granted 
the motion. An order thereon was filed August 28, 2000. (R. 166) Notice of appeal was 
thereafter filed on September 8, 2000 (R. 170). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs fulfilled the purpose of the notice of claim requirements. There is no 
question but that the notice of claim was received by those exercising the function of 
adjusting and litigating the claims against Kane County. The notice was timely, proper as 
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to form, and delivered to the Kane County Clerk's office. Thereafter, within the purview 
of his duties and with the authority vested in him as Kane County Attorney, Carl 
Winchester expressly directed that any and all communication or correspondence should 
be directed to attorney Hutton, who had been retained to defend the county. As the record 
before the Court shows, Ms. Hutton had in fact received the notice of claim as of that 
time. As a result, plaintiffs were secure in their belief that the notice of claim resided 
with the proper authority to investigate and adjust the claim. 
Utah appellate courts have stated that in interpreting the notice requirements of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the statute will be interpreted consistent with the 
overall purpose of the act itself. The primary purpose of the notice and claim requirement 
is to afford the responsible public authorities an opportunity to timely investigate, and if 
appropriate, settle claims brought against governmental entities. That purpose was clearly 
fulfilled under the present circumstances as the notice of claim was filed well before the 
one year deadline for filing the claim. However, the county attorney acknowledged 
receipt of the same and directed all further correspondence to go to Ms. Hutton. The 
purposes of the notice of claim requirements had therefore been fulfilled. 
This conclusion is supported by a decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in Bischel 
v. Meritt 907 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1995) wherein a plaintiff called the county attorney's 
office and was told to send her notice of claim to that office. The plaintiff in Bischel 
followed the instruction of the county attorney's office, but when the lawsuit was 
6 
brought, the county moved to dismiss because the notice of claim had not been served 
upon the county commissioners. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's 
dismissal and found that the notice of claim to the county attorney was valid. The Court 
of Appeals based this decision, in large part, on the significant fact that the attorney in the 
county attorney's office had verified her apparent authority to receive the notice on behalf 
of the county commission. Plaintiffs ask this court to affirm the reasoning ofBischel and 
apply that reasoning to the present case. 
The present circumstances, as well as applicable law, show that the County 
Attorney is empowered to act on behalf of the county, particularly in the defense of 
claims made against the county. As such, the fact that the County Attorney indicated that 
all further correspondence and communication should go through Ms. Hutton, coupled 
with the fact plaintiffs knew that Ms. Hutton already possessed the notice of claim and 
had requested further information, leads to a conclusion that the notice of claim was 
effectual in this case. 
Further, the plaintiffs maintain that additional discovery should have been allowed 
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(f). It is universally held that when matters 
outside the pleadings are considered in a motion under Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the motion is properly treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. 
Plaintiffs motion to dismiss was supported by an affidavit. The defendant's opposition 
was likewise supported with an affidavit. As a result, the trial court considered matters 
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outside the pleadings, yet the trial court would allow no discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f). 
In this regard, the trial court abused its discretion. Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) affidavit spells 
out clearly the discovery plaintiffs wished to pursue. Since Ms. Ramsay signed for the 
notices of claim, plaintiffs should be allowed to discover exactly what she did with them. 
The only remedy for the court at this point is to reverse the dismissal and remand the case 
back to the district court in order for this discovery to ensue. 
Finally, plaintiffs maintain that this court should take this opportunity to align 
Utah's law with those state jurisdictions which require "substantial compliance" with 
notice of claim requirements, instead of "strict compliance." Public policy stands in favor 
of allowing citizens to bring claims against the government where the government has 
acted in a tortious manner. Plaintiffs acknowledge that limitations must be set on the 
public's abilities to bring claims, but the finality sought to be created by the notice of 
claim requirements can be fulfilled by requiring strict compliance with the timing 
provisions of a notice of claim, but allowing for substantial compliance as to the form of 
the notice and its delivery. 
The trial court erroneously concluded as a matter of law that the notice of claim 
was defective. Therefore, this court must reverse. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS FULFILLED THE PURPOSE OF THE NOTICE OF CLAIM 
REQUIREMENTS; DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM RAISING 
THE NOTICE OF CLAIM ISSUE 
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Plaintiffs delivery of the notice was legally sufficient. The facts and 
circumstances of this case indicate that defendant should be estopped from asserting the 
failure to file the notice of claim with the county clerk. The real claim of the defendants 
is that the claim was not directed to the County Clerk. The record indicates that the 
notices were in fact received in the County Clerk's office by an employee of the County 
Clerk. There is no question but that the notice of claim was received by those with 
exercising function of adjusting and litigating claims against Kane County. Moreover, 
under the actual or apparent authority of his position as Kane County attorney, Carl 
Winchester expressly directed the plaintiffs to direct all further communication and 
correspondence to an attorney who had been hired by the county's insurer. This all 
inclusive statement would encompass any notice of claim. Thus, the continuing activities 
of the defendants in the following many months prior to the expiration of time for the 
notice of claim to be filed, and the information forwarded, clearly constituted a proper 
notice of claim. Even if such did not constitute as proper notice, the activities and 
representation of Mr. Winchester lead to the conclusion that defendants should be 
estopped from asserting the notice of claim requirements as being fatal to plaintiffs 
claims. 
Utah appellate courts have explained that interpreting the notice of requirements 
the Utah governmental immunity act they will do so in a manner consistent with the 
overall purpose of the act itself. Brittian v. State by and through Utah Department of 
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Employment, 882 P.2d 666, 670 (Utah App. 1994). This court recently explained that a 
notice of claim provides the entity sued with the factual details of the incident and 
provides the governmental entity "an opportunity to correct the condition that caused the 
injury, and perhaps settle the matter without the expense of litigation." Rushton v. Salt 
Lake County. 1999 UT 36,1} 20, 977 P.2d 1201 (quoting Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp.. 
955 P.2d 343, 345 (Utah 1998). 
As explained by the Utah Supreme court, "[I]t is necessary to consider the 
policy of the notice requirement so that in any particular case the facts may 
be evaluated to determine that the intent of the statute has been 
accomplished." 
Brittian. 882 P.2d 666, 670. 
The Brittian court, citing the Utah Supreme Court, explained the purpose of the 
notice of claim requirement. 
[T]he primary purpose of the notice claim requirement is to afford the 
responsible public authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and timely 
investigation of the merits of a claim and to arrive at a timely settlement if 
appropriate thereby appointing the expenditure of public revenue for costly 
and unnecessary litigation. 
Brittian, 882P.2d at 671. In finding that the plaintiff in Brittian had fulfilled the notice of 
claim requirements by filing a notice of claim with the division of risk management,3 
which agency had the responsibility to adjust the claim, the court concluded: 
Considering the duties delegated to Risk Management, it appears the state entity 
3
 Brittian was decided under a predecessor statute. 
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entrusted with investigating and settling or defending the claim received the 
requisite notice in a timely manner and well within the one year period imposed by 
the statute. Filing notice with Risk Management in no way inhibited the possibility 
of settling the claim without resort of litigation. In fact, given the powers and 
responsibility the legislature has bestowed upon risk management, the opposite is 
true. Filing notice with Risk Management facilitated settlement discussion by 
providing notice to the agency responsible for investigating and settling the 
claim.... Indeed, the record indicates that Risk Management activity pursued 
settling Brittian's claim. 
In the present matter, the exact same factual scenario is presented. The letters by Mr. 
Winchester and Ms. Hutton point out that Ms. Hutton was delegated the duty of 
investigating or settling or defending the claim which had been received by virtue of the 
notice of claim filed with the county commissioners. Filing the notice with the county 
commissioners has in no way inhibited the possibility of settling the claim without resort 
to litigation. Instead, Ms. Hutton attempted to verify the claim by the submission of the 
consent to the release of medical records. All of the activities occurred in the months 
before the notice was due. Thus, the agents for Kane County actively pursued 
investigating and settling this claim. 
The holding ofBrittain obtains here. As the plaintiff in Brittian had timely filed 
the notice of claim, the Brittain court only required substantial compliance with the 
statute as to the notice's delivery. Such substantial compliance meets all of the goals of 
the Governmental Immunity Act. The correct entity had an opportunity to investigate the 
claim. That entity could thereafter adjust and settle the claim. 
The case of Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority. 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980) buttresses 
11 
the position that the notice of claim in this matter was satisfactory. In StahL the plaintiff 
was rear ended by a UTA bus. The same day as a the accident, plaintiff was contacted by 
the insurance adjuster for the insurance carrier for UTA. 
He obtained a statement from her concerning the accident and wrote a two 
page report based on her answers to his inquiries. Vance also had Plaintiff 
sign a statement and medical information release allowing her physical 
physician to disclose information to him. 
StahL, 618 P.2d at 480. Based upon this statement alone and the medical releases, the 
Utah Supreme court held that a proper notice of claim had been made. 
When the plaintiff in Stahl brought the lawsuit against UTA, UTA argued that the 
plaintiff had not brought her claim within the then applicable 30 day period. However, 
the Utah Supreme Court in Stahl found that: "There was substantial compliance with the 
30 day notice provision and defendant was in no way prejudiced by plaintiffs failure to 
comply with the formality of filing a claim." Id at 42. So holding, the Stahl court found 
the insurance agent was authorized by law to handle the approval and denial of plaintiff s 
claims, thus representing the interests of the government. The court found that the 
insurance adjuster's actions in obtaining a signed statement of the plaintiffs version of 
the accident were for all practical purposes the acts of the UTA. Under these facts, the 
Utah Supreme court held: "Clearly there was substantial compliance with the notice of 
claim provision. No undue hardship resulted from the notice being given to and agent of 
12 
the party named in the statute." Id.4 
With approval, the Stahl court reviewed the Pennsylvania case of Badger v. Upper 
Darby Township, 348 Pa. 551, 36 A.2d 507 (1944) where plaintiffs counsel, within the 
prescribed period, gave written notice to the insurance carrier for the defendant Township 
rather than the clerk or secretary of such municipality, as required by statute. In allowing 
the plaintiff to maintain the action even in light of this failure, the Badger court held: 
In determining, in its discretion, whether a failure to file a notice prescribed 
by the act should be excused, a weighty circumstance could be considered 
by the court as whether or not the municipality has suffered any undue 
hardship. Here there is nothing to indicate that it did so suffer. Of 
controlling importance is the fact that within the prescribed period the 
insurance company was notified that the claim was being made, was 
furnished with the essential facts regarding the accident, and, by designating 
a physician to examine the plaintiff apparently admitted its responsibilities 
to investigate the claim. If, as would appear, the insurance the company is 
the real party in interest a decision denying plaintiff the right to prosecute a 
claim because of failure to give written notice to the township would be one 
of sure literalism, for had such notice been given, the township would 
undoubtably, in due course, have turned it over to the company to which 
plaintiffs counsel had sent it in the first instance. It is no unusual for 
lawyers representing claimants in accident cases to communicate with 
insurance companies directly rather than with defendants, since the former 
control negotiations for settlement and prepared the defense in case of 
litigation. 
Id at 508-09. 
In the present circumstances the applicability of this reasoning is even more plain. 
4Plaintiff recognizes that the Stahl court attempted to distinguish the Transit Act 
from the Governmental Immunity Act at issue here. However, plaintiff maintains that the 
distinction does not survive scrutiny and that the underlying holding of the Stahl court 
obtains here. 
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The governmental entity in the present circumstances has not claimed any undue 
hardship. In fact, the record is clear that the claim in this matter was made months before 
the notice of claim was even required. The lawsuit was filed on the one year anniversary 
of the accident date. Clearly, Ms. Hutton, representing Kane County and its insurer, 
admitted her responsibility to investigate the claim by the letter of March 8, 1999. Even 
more importantly, the Kane County attorney by his letter of March 20, 1999 indicated that 
"All further communication and correspondence" should be referred to Ms. Hutton. In 
other words, from that point on, the county had designated Ms. Hutton for the receipt of 
any notice whatsoever. It would be an inequitable conclusion and unjust for this court to 
hold that plaintiffs could not rely on the county attorney himself or other representatives 
of the county. 
The case ofBischel v. Merit 907 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1995) leads to a similar 
conclusion. In Bischel a plaintiff was uncertain where a notice of claim should be filed. 
The plaintiff called the county offices and was told to send the notice to a specific 
attorney at the county attorney's office. The plaintiff then called the county attorney to 
confirm the instruction. The notice was sent by certified mail to the county attorney. 
However, when the action was brought, the county moved to dismiss the case based on 
the single fact that the notice was addressed to the county attorney instead of the county 
commission. 
The court of appeals reversed the trial court and found the notice of claim to the 
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county attorney was valid. The court of appeals based its decision, in large part, on the 
significant fact that the county attorney verified her apparent authority to receive the 
notice on behalf of the county commission. Bischel 902 P.2d at 278. Plaintiffs ask this 
court to affirm the reasoning ofBischel and apply that reasoning herein. In the present 
action, with the clear authority of Kane County, Kane County's attorney, Mr. Winchester 
directed that all further communications and correspondence should be made to Ms. 
Hutton. Ms. Hutton had already acknowledged the receipt of the notice of claim. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs knew that the notice of claim was already in possession of that 
person who should have the notice of claim according to the county attorney Mr. 
Winchester. 
The notice provided by plaintiffs in the present action gave Kane County ample 
opportunity to investigate and negotiate the claims. The Bischel court concluded in that 
case: "Bischel thus fulfilled the purpose of the notice requirement by filing the notice of 
her claim with the designated person in the county attorneys office." Id 278. In the 
present circumstances, plaintiffs have fulfilled the notice requirements by filing the notice 
with the county commissioners and by further following the instructions of the Kane 
County attorney that all further communication and correspondence be referred to Mr. 
Hutton. 
The Bischel court concluded: 
Considering the duties and authority delegated to the County Attorney's 
Office, it is evident that the governmental entity entrusted with 
15 
investigating and settling or defending the claim received the requisite 
notice well within the one year period imposed by the statute. Directing and 
delivering her notice of claim to the County Attorney's Office in no way 
inhibited settling Bischel's claim without resort of litigation. In fact, given 
the powers and responsibilities the County has bestowed upon the County 
Attorney's Office, the opposite is true. See Id at 672. Filing notice with the 
County Attorney's Office facilitated settlement discussion. Indeed, the 
County Attorney's Office actively pursued settlement of Bischel's claim, 
even paying her property damage. 
Id at 278-79. Likewise, in the present circumstances, directing the notice to the county 
commissioners in no way inhibited the settlement of plaintiffs' claim without resort to 
litigation. The county attorney turned the entire matter over to its insurance company, 
which in turn turned it over to its current attorneys months before any notice of claim was 
required. Those attorneys followed up on receiving supplemental information regarding 
the claim. In the final analysis, once the Kane County attorney directed that all further 
communication and correspondence go through Ms. Hutton, no further claims or notice 
were required. 
Applying estoppel in a notice of claim situation is not new to this court. In Rice v. 
Granite School Dist. 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969) this court held that a 
school district was estopped to assert a statute of limitations where a claimant had been 
induced to non-action by the representations of an adjuster of the school district's insurer. 
This court held that a material issue of fact precluding summary judgment existed as to 
the application of the facts to the issue of estoppel. Accordingly, the matter was 
remanded to the trial court. 
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Again, in the present matter, plaintiffs reasonably relied upon the representation of 
the Kane County Attorney as to the person who needed to possess the notice of claim, Ms. 
Hutton. As stated, Ms. Hutton had already confirmed her possession of that same notice 
of claim. 
Accordingly, the trial court erroneously concluded that plaintiff had failed to fulfill 
the purpose of the notice of claim requirements. 
The County Attorney had the authority, real or apparent, to confirm the 
person to possess and act upon the notice of claim. The Kane County attorney had 
authority to direct plaintiffs to direct all communication to Ms. Hutton. Once again, the 
case of Bischel v. Merritt 907 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1995) is instructive. In Bischel, the 
plaintiff sent a notice of claim to the County Attorney's Office as instructed by the 
County Attorney's Office. In deciding the notice of claim was sufficient under those 
circumstances, the Utah Court of Appeals stated: "Considering the duties and authority 
delegated to the county attorney's office, it is evident that the governmental entity 
entrusted with investigating and settling or defending the claim received the requisite 
notice well within the one year period imposed by the statue." Id. at 278. The Court of 
Appeals noted that in Bischel the court was not faced with a case where the plaintiff had 
given no notice, or where the notice of claim was defective in its form or content, or 
where the notice had not been filed within one year. The Bischel court concluded: "It 
appears at best disigenuous for the county to argue that Bishel's notice was inadequate 
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merely because she directed and delivered it at the county commission and the county 
attorney's office as instructed. The public deserves more consistent, more credible 
treatment from its servants." 
This holding is in concert with this court's recent ruling in Salt Lake County 
Commission v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 1999 UT 73, ffl 17 and 19, 985 P.2d 899 
where this court unequivically stated that the county attorney represents the entity of the 
county. The county attorney acts as the attorney for the county. This conclusion finds 
support in Utah's statutes. Whether a county attorney acts in a prosecution district or in a 
county which is not in a prosecution district, a county attorney is charged to "defend all 
actions brought against the county." See Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 (7)(a)( 1995) and §17-
18-1.5(5)(a)(1997). Further, Utah Code Ann. §17-18-2 (1993) provides: "The county 
attorney is the legal adviser of the county. He must attend meetings of the county 
legislative body when required, and must oppose all claims and accounts against the 
county when he deems them unjust or illegal." Thus, the Kane County Attorney, Mr. 
Winchester, clearly had the statutory authority to direct plaintiffs that all communications 
and correspondence should go to Ms. Hutton. 
Even if the county attorney did not have statutory authority, his apparent authority 
was clear. The position of the county attorney creates an appearance which would direct 
any person to reasonably believe that the county attorney had authority to act on the 
county's behalf. Therefore, although actual authority is self-apparent in the present 
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matter, in any event the county attorney had apparent authority for his direction. See 
Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp.. 762 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah 1988); Walker 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 672 P.2d 73,75 (Utah 1983). Accordingly, plaintiffs acted 
reasonably and in reliance upon the county attorney when faced with facts and 
circumstances where the county attorney had directed all communication and 
correspondence be sent to Ms. Hutton and Ms. Hutton had already confirmed to plaintiffs 
that she possessed the actual notice of claim itself As a result, the trial court should have 
concluded that the notice of claim was proper. Therefore, the trial court must be reversed. 
II. ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED 
PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56(f). 
It is universally held that when matters outside the pleadings under Rule 12 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are considered, the motion is properly treated as one for 
summary judgment under rule 56. Thavne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120 (Utah 
1994); Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1983). In fact, in Shunk v. State, 924 P.2d 
879 (Utah 1996) this court reviewed a governmental immunity case where matters were 
examined outside the pleadings and therefore the motion was decided under Rule 56. 
Defendants' motion to dismiss in the present circumstances was supported by an 
affidavit, as was plaintiffs' opposition. Accordingly, the trial court of necessity 
considered matters outside the pleadings. As a result, the present motion is one which 
was considered under rule 56. Pursuant to rule 56(f) plaintiffs filed an affidavit seeking 
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further discovery which was denied by the trial court. Plaintiffs should be allowed 
additional discovery to investigate the full extent of Kane County's receipt of the notice 
of claim. While the affidavit of Holly Ramsey does state that neither Mary Wheeler nor 
Petra Srbova filed notices of claim with the Kane County Clerk on or before September 
27, 1999, the affidavit does not set forth that the County Clerk did not in fact receive the 
notice by some other means. Discovery on this issue should be allowed. As such, 
plaintiffs wish to obtain a full and complete claim file held by defendants in this matter, 
including all correspondence between Kane County and their attorneys. Plaintiffs need 
to see any documentation or reports generated by Kane County, or its insurer. Most 
importantly, plaintiffs wish to depose Ms. Ramsay. 
Therefore, based upon the rule 56(f) affidavit previously filed, the motion to 
dismiss should not have been granted, but discovery should have been allowed to 
proceed. The only remedy for this court at this point is to reverse the dismissal and 
remand the case back to the district court for this discovery to ensue. 
III. ONLY SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE SHOULD BE REQUIRED AS TO 
THE DELIVERY OF A NOTICE OF CLAIM, 
Judge Orme of the Utah Court of Appeals recently noted: 
Significantly, the rule requiring "strict compliance" with the notice 
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act does not come from the 
language of the act itself. See Utah Code Annotated Sections 63-30-1 to 38 
(1997 and Supp. 2000). Instead, the "strict compliance" standard was first 
applied to Utah's Governmental Immunity Act by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Scarborough v. Granite School District. 531 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1975). 
This shift in Moreno from a blanket "strict compliance" standard for 
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notices of claim to more of a "substantial compliance" standard, at least in 
certain situations, is fully consistent with the more charitable view taken in 
many other jurisdictions, which require only substantial compliance with 
the state's governmental immunity statute. See, e.g. Brasher v. City of 
Burmingham. 341 So.2d 137, 138 (Ala. 1976): Woodsmall v. Regional 
Trans. Dist. 800 P.2d 63,69 (Colo. 1990) (en banc); Washington v. City of 
Columbus, 222 S.E.2d. 583, 589 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975); Vermeer v. Snellen 
190 N.W.2d 389, 394 (Iowa 1971); Carr v. Town of Shubuta. 733 So.2d 
261,263 (Miss. 1999). 
Great West Cas. v. Utah Dept. of Trans.. 2001 UT App 54, % 15 note 6, 415 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 26. In Moreno, this court found a notice of claim "legally sufficient" where a 
guardian of a child "mistakenly assumed" they would be the beneficiaries of a wrongful 
death action regarding a minor decedent. This court allowed the notice of claim where 
plaintiff acted upon advice of counsel and "in good faith." Moreno v. Board of Educ. of 
Jordan School Dist., 926 P.2d 886, 892 (Utah 1996). A copy of the Moreno decision is 
attached hereto in Appendix B. 
As Judge Orme recognized, the strict compliance requirement is a creation of this 
court. Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-11(2) provides: 
Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or 
against its employee for an act or ommission occurring during the 
performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority, shall file a written notice with the entity before 
maintaining an action, regardless whether or not the function giving rise to 
the claims is governmental. 
(emphasis added). Thus, the heart and soul of the Governmental Immunity Act's 
governmental notice of claim requirements is that a notice of claim be filed with the 
21 
entity.5 In the present circumstances, there is no question but that the notice of claim was 
filed with the entity. The present dispute arises in the next subsection which requires: 
The notice shall be: 
(ii) directed and delivered to: 
(B) the county clerk when the claim is against the county [.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(B)(1998). 
In the present circumstances, the notice of claim requirement has been fulfilled 
because the entity received the notices and it had been delivered to that person the county 
designated as the direct repository for notice of claims for this claim. However, this court 
should take this opportunity to modify its standard as to notices of claim to a "substantial 
compliance" standard instead of "strict compliance" so far as form of the notice and its 
delivery are concerned. As long as the purpose and intent of subsection (2) of § 63-30-11 
is met, that is, the entity has received the claim, the notice of claim should be found 
effective if it otherwise substantially meets the notice requirements and is timely. 
In fact, long ago this court essentially applied the substantial compliance standard 
5Before the trial court below defendants cited the court to Bellonio v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 911 P.2d 1294 (Utah App. 1996). A copy of Bellonio is attached in Appendix 
B. Bellonio upheld the dismissal of a claim where a notice of claim had been presented to 
the wrong entity. This court characterized the holding of Bellonio as: "dismissing action 
by pedestrian injured in airport parking terrace for failure to serve governing body of 
city." Thus, Bellonio's facts are readily distinguishable from the present case. Here, the 
correct entity received the notice, acknowledged that receipt, and gave direction 
concerning the notice. 
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to a notice of claim issue in Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 362, 412 P.2d 449 
(1966). A copy is attached hereto in Appendix B. In Spencer, a plaintiff had fallen on an 
allegedly defective sidewalk. At that time, Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-77 (1953) required a 
person to file a claim within 30 days of the injury. Although the claim was filed within 
30 days, the trial court dismissed the action because the notice did not state the amount of 
damages claimed. The Spencer court noted: 
There is a wide difference between presenting no claim at all and presenting 
one of the kind shown here which evidently fulfills the main purpose of the 
statute: of giving the City the essential facts as soon as reasonably possible 
after the injury so that it will have ample opportunity to make a proper 
investigation. 
Id. at 450. The Spencer court then held: 
Inasmuch as the plaintiff filed the claim within the 30 days allowed by 
statute, the claim was sufficient to constitute substantial compliance with 
the statute and apprize the City of the essentials thereof, it is our opinion 
that the dismissal was in error. 
Id. (emphasis added). This court should reaffirm this holding and clarify that 
jurisdictional a trial court cannot entertain an action against a governmental entity 
where no notice of claim was filed or where the notice is simply untimely. However, 
where a notice is timely submitted, the notice of claim should suffice if the claimant 
substantially complies with the form and delivery requirements of the statute. Such a 
conclusion would be in concert with the reality of the modern relationship between the 
government and its citizens. 
As Judge Orme noted: 
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Aside from the niceties of prior case law adopting and reiterating a ''strict 
compliance" standard found nowhere in the governing statute, if a 
technically deficient notice of claim nonetheless does what such a notice is 
designed to do and provides the State with enough information to become 
aware of the incident, conduct an investigation, and make an informed 
decision about its liability, the State should not be so quick to hide behind 
the cloak of "sovereign immunity." That doctrine arose when the monarch 
was rather antagonistic to his subjects and wished to insulate the treasury 
from the just claims of the peasantry, who were expected to embrace the 
fiction that "the King can do no wrong." We know better now, and in 
modern America, where the state enjoys a much more benevolent 
relationship with its citizens and has a more realistic view of its own 
fallibility, the enlightened sovereign should be willing to accept 
responsibility for its negligence when the deficiencies in a notice of claim 
do not actually prejudice its ability to investigate a claim, evaluate its merit, 
and resolve it in timely fashion. Such an adjustment in the philosophy 
underlying our State's sovereign immunity scheme must, however, come at 
the hands of the legislature and not this court. 
Great West Casualty v. Utah Department of Transportation. 2001 UT App 54, ^ 18,415 
Utah Adv. Rep. 26. While Judge Orme's sentiments concerning the realities of a strict 
compliance standard are accurate, an adjustment of the philosophy should come from this 
court. The Utah Court of Appeals was compelled to follow this court's established rule 
of strict compliance. However, where the genesis of the strict compliance rule is found in 
this court's jurisprudence, and not in the statute at issue, this court should review the 
application of the strict compliance standard. 
Public policy stands in favor of allowing citizens to bring claims against the 
government where the government has acted in a tortious manner. Plaintiffs 
acknowledge that limitations must be set on the public's abilities to bring claims, but the 
finality sought to be created by the notice of claim requirements can be fulfilled by 
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requiring strict compliance with the timing provisions of a notice of claim, but allowing 
for substantial compliance as to the form of the notice and its delivery. 
When this court imposed its strict compliance requirement upon the statutory 
notice of claim rubric, the court's action was not without dissent. Scarborough v. Granite 
School District 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975)(Justice Maughan dissenting)6; Varoz v. Sevev, 
29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435 (1973)(Justice Ellett dissenting); Gallegos v. Midvale City. 
27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972)(Justice Ellett dissenting). 
This court should review its position as to strict compliance and allow for justice. 
As the legislature directed in Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (1953): 
The rule of common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly 
construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes 
establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, 
and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally 
construed with the view to effect the objects of the statutes and promote 
justice. Whenever there is any variance between the rules of equity and the 
rules of common law in reference to the same matter the rules of equity 
shall prevail. 
Justice Maughan invoked this section when he noted: 
In view of the fact that our statutes are to be liberally construed to effect 
their objectives and to promote justice, I would not extend, by implication, 
the terms of 63-30-13, particularly where it is invoked by a political 
6In Scarborough, Justice Maughan stated: "The instant matter sparks recollection 
of the instructions given by the Khalif Omar, to his first Kadi c. 900 A.D.: 'If thou seest 
fit to judge differently from yesterday, do not hesitate to follow the truth as thou seest it; 
for truth is eternal and it is better to return to the true than persist in the false.'" 
Scarborough, 531 P.2d at 483, note 5. (Please note if using Westlaw electronic services 
that the Westlaw transcriber left out the paragraph to which this footnote is ascribed). 
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subdivision to avoid liability. 
Scarborough. 531 P.2d at 483. 
Since this court did in fact impose the strict compliance standard by implication, 
this court should review this position and align its conclusion to promote justice and 
equity. Citizens with colorable claims against the state government should be able to 
proceed if they have substantially complied with the notice of claim provisions in a timely 
manner. The weight of equity can be balanced by requiring that a notice be filed and that 
the notice is timely. However, this court should allow for substantial compliance as to the 
form of the notice and its delivery. Since plaintiffs did in fact substantially comply with 
the statute by timely filing a notice of claim, the trial court should be reversed and this 
matter remanded for trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Kane County, the entity concerned, received the notice of claim, and more 
particularly, because the person whom the county attorney designated as the proper 
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recipient for the notice of claim did in fact possess the notice of claim, the trial court's 
decision to dismiss the matter must be reversed. Further, for the other reasons outlined in 
plaintiffs' brief, the trial court's conclusion must be reversed and the matter remanded for 
trial. 
DATED AND SIGNED this 16th day of March, 2001. 
R. PHIL IVIE 
DAVID N. MORTENSEN 
JEFFERY C. PEATROSS 
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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ADDENDUM A 
UT Code § 63-30-11, Claim for Page 1 
injury—Notice—Contents—Service—Legal disability. 
Utah Code §63-30-11 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN 
GENERAL 
CHAPTER 30. 
GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT 
Current through End of 2000 General 
Sess 
§ 63-30-11. Claim for injury—Notice-
Contents—Service—Legal disability. 
< Text of section effective until 
July 1,2001 > 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of 
limitations that would apply if the claim were 
against a pnv ate person begins to run 
(2) Any person ha\mg a claim for injury 
agamst a go\ernmental entity, or agamst its 
employee for an act or omission occurring during 
the performance of the employee's duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority shall file a written notice of claim with 
the entity before maintaining an action, regardless 
of whether or not the function giving nse to the 
claim is characterized as governmental 
(3)(a) The notice of claim shall set forth 
(I) a brief statement of the facts, 
(n) the nature of the claim asserted, and 
(in) the damages incurred by the claimant so far 
as they are known 
(b) The notice of claim shall be 
(I) signed by the person making the claim or 
that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal 
guardian, and 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No 
(u) directed and delrvered to 
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is 
agamst an incorporated city or town, 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is agamst 
a county, 
(C) the superintendent or business 
administrator of the board, when the claim is 
agamst a school district or board of education, 
(D) the president or secretan of the board, 
when the claim is agamst a special district, 
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is 
agamst the State of Utah, or 
(F) a member of the governing board, the 
executive director, or executive secretary, when 
the claim is against any other public board, 
commission, or bodv 
(4)(a) If the claimant is under the age of 
majority, or mentally incompetent and without a 
legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the 
claimant may apply to the court to extend the tune 
for service of notice of claim 
(b)(i) After hearing and notice to the 
governmental entity, the court may extend the 
time for service of notice of claim 
(n) The court may not grant an extension that 
exceeds the applicable statute of limitations 
*21751 (c) In determining whether or not to 
grant an extension, the court shall consider 
whether the delay m serving the notice of claim 
will substantially prejudice the governmental 
entity m maintaining its defense on the merits 
Amended b\ Laws 1991 c 76 Laws 1998 c 164, § 1, eff 
May 4, 1998 
< For text of section effective 
July 1, 2001, see § 63-30-11, post > 
Search this disc for cases citmg this section 
laim to original U.S. Govt, works 
UT Code § 63-30-13, Claim against political subdivision or its Page 1 
employee—Time for filing notice. 
Utah Code § 63-30-13 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS 
IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 30. 
GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT 
(Information regarding effective 
dates, repeals, etc. is provided 
subsequently in this document.) 
Current through End of 2000 General 
Sess. 
§ 63-30-13. Claim against political 
subdivision or its employee—Time for 
filing notice. 
A claim against a political subdivision, or 
against its employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of the 
employee's duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority, is barred 
unless notice of claim is filed with the governing 
body of the political subdivision according to the 
requirements of Section 63-30-11 within one year 
after the claim arises, or before the expiration of 
any extension of time granted under Section 
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the claim is characterized 
as governmental. 
Amended by Laws 1987, c. 75; Laws 1998, c. 164, § 3, eff 
May 4, 1998. 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN 
GENERAL 
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Owen RUSHTON, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political subdivision of 
the State of 
Utah, Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 980039. 
April 16, 1999. 
Property owner filed action against county seeking 
return of excess land mistakenly conveyed to county in 
condemnation proceedings. The Third District, Salt 
Lake County, Glenn K. Iwasaki, J., dismissed property 
owner's claim, and property owner appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Russon, J., held that: (1) property 
owner did not meet written notice of claim 
requirements of immunity statute, and (2) property 
owner's action was barred by statute of limitations. 
Affirmed. 
Howe, C.J., concurred in the result and filed an 
opinion. 
Stewart, J., dissented. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Statutes <3==> 176 
361 — 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361kl76 Judicial Authority and Duty. 
The proper interpretation of a statute is a question 
of law. 
[2] Municipal Corporations <®=^741.20 
268 — 
268X11 Torts 
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and 
Corporate Powers in 
General 
268k741 Notice or Presentation of Claims 
for Injury 
268k741.20 Requirement as Mandatory or 
Condition Precedent. 
Failure to file a written notice of claim against a 
governmental entity for an injury deprives the court of 
subject matter jurisdiction. U.C.A. 1953,63-30-11 (2). 
[3] Municipal Corporations ®=>741 40( 1) 
268 — 
268X11 Torts 
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and 
Corporate Powers in 
General 
268k741 Notice or Presentation of Claims 
for Injury 
268k741.40 Excuses for and Relief from 
Delay or Failure 
268k741.40(1) In General. 
Actual notice does not cure a party's failure to meet 
the notice of claim requirements of the Governmental 
Irnmunity Act. U.C.A.1953,63-30-1 l(3)(a). 
[4] Municipal Corporations <©=>741.15 
268 — 
268X11 Torts 
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and 
Corporate Powers in 
General 
268k741 Notice or Presentation of Claims 
for Injury 
268k741.15 Necessity and Purpose. 
A notice of claim pursuant to the Governmental 
Immunity Act provides the governmental entity an 
opportunity to correct the condition that caused the 
injury, evaluate the claim, and perhaps settle the matter 
without the expense of litigation. U.C.A.1953, 
63-30-1 l(3)(a). 
[5] Counties @^>212 
104 — 
104X11 Actions 
104k211 Conditions Precedent 
104k212 Notice or Demand. 
Letters hand-delivered by property owner's wife to 
county board of commissioners did not meet written 
notice of claim requirements of Governmental 
Immunity Act in action seeking return of excess land 
mistakenly conveyed to county in condemnation 
proceedings, where letters simply requested county's 
assistance in settling dispute so that property' owner 
could develop property and did not alert board to 
impeding legal action or mention property owner's 
intention to seek a judicial remedy. U.C.A.1953, 
63-30-1 l(3)(a). 
[6] Limitation of Actions <©^66( 14) 
241 — 
24 III Computation of Period of Limitation 
24111(B) Performance of Condition, Demand, 
and Notice 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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241k66 Demand 
241k66(14) Property Wrongfully Received 
or Held. 
Even if property- owner filed a valid notice of claim 
against county seeking return of excess land mistakenly 
conveyed to county in condemnation proceedings, 
action based on the claim was required to be filed 
within one year after claim was denied or deemed 
denied. U.CA.1953,63-30-14,63-30-15. 
Carvel R. Shaffer, Bountiful, for plaintiff. 
Douglas R. Short, Paul G. Maughan, Salt Lake 
City, for defendant. 
RUSSON, Justice: 
% 1 Plaintiff Owen Rushton appeals the district 
court's order of dismissal in favor of defendant Salt 
Lake County. The district court dismissed Rushton's 
claim against Salt Lake County on the ground that 
Rushton failed to comply with the notice requirements 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
If 2 In November of 1967, Salt Lake County (the 
"County") filed an eminent domain action to condemn 
several parcels of property' in order to widen 5400 
South at its intersection with 4300 West. As part of 
that action. County7 officials sought to condemn .53 
acres of property owned by Owen Rushton. 
If 3 In December of 1967, the court issued an order 
of immediate occupancy for the property in question, 
which gave the County7 the right to occupy and use the 
property in *1202 the manner intended by the original 
condemnation resolution. 
f 4 In August of 1969, LaMar Duncan, a deputy 
county attorney, visited the Rushtons' home and 
requested that they execute a quitclaim deed. Rushton, 
his first wife Carol, and his mother Annie conveyed the 
requested property to the County by quitclaim deed on 
August 29, 1969. (FN1) The quitclaim deed conveyed 
1.02 acres of the Rushtons' property to the County, .49 
acres more than that which had been condemned. 
U 5 In September of 1969, the County, through its 
Board of Commissioners (the "Board"), approved 
payment to the Rushtons for the purchase of their land 
and issued a "claim form" requesting payment for 1.02 
acres of land at $3,500 per acre, for a total of $3,573. 
However, the claim form did not have a warrant 
number and was not signed by the County 
Commissioners. Rushton asserts that he never 
received payment for any property7 conveyed by the 
quitclaim deed. 
% 6 The County used the Rushtons' land as 
proposed—to widen the road at the intersection of 5400 
South and 4300 West. The County did not, however, 
use all of the land the Rushtons conveyed in the 
quitclaim deed. For the next twenty-four years, the 
Rushtons cared for the excess portion of property 
conveyed to the County, which they believed to be 
theirs. (FN2) During that time, neither the County7 nor 
the Rushtons attempted to make use of the excess land. 
% 7 In June of 1994, the Rushtons applied for a 
conditional use jpermit to build a group dwelling on the 
excess land. The County denied the Rushtons' 
application on the ground that the Rushtons had 
conveyed that land to the County by quitclaim deed in 
1969. 
% 8 On September 14, 1994, Rushton's second wife 
Myrna attended a Salt Lake County Commission 
meeting. (FN3) She presented a letter addressed to the 
Board expressing her concerns over the excess land the 
Rushtons had conveyed to the County. The letter stated 
the Rushtons' desire to develop the excess land and 
their inability to do so because of the boundary dispute. 
It also requested that the boundary be "corrected on the 
county record .. to match the original court order," 
(FN4) which condemned only .53 acres. Myrna 
contended there should be no charge for correcting the 
deed and no further delay in obtaining the necessary 
building permits to complete the proposed 
development. 
^ 9 In addition, the letter detailed the history of the 
condemnation action and the quitclaim executed by the 
Rushtons. The letter stated that neither Owen, Carol, 
nor Annie realized the deed they signed conveyed more 
property7 than originally condemned by the County. 
Rather, they believed they had conveyed only .53 acres. 
In her letter, Myrna wrote that there had never been a 
marker or a fence to indicate the point where the 
Rushtons' land ended and the County's began. Instead, 
the Rushtons had used the curb and gutter constructed 
by the County as the boundary between what they 
believed to be their property and the land the County 
used to widen the road. Myrna's letter reiterated the 
Rushtons' claim that over the years they had maintained 
land which, unbeknownst to them, was owned by the 
County. Finally, the Rushtons asserted that the County 
never paid them for the value of their land. 
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\ 10 In response, the Board stated that the 
quitclaim deed signed by the Rushtons and filed with 
the County indicated that the County owned the land in 
question. The Board suggested the Rushtons might be 
able to purchase the excess land from the Count) to 
proceed with their development and referred Myrna to 
the Salt Lake County Real Estate Department. 
*1203 H 11 On September 15, 1994, Myrna 
presented a second letter addressed to then-Count}' 
Commissioner Jim Bradley. In this letter, Myrna 
objected to the Board's suggestion that the Rushtons 
simply buy back the excess land from the County. She 
reiterated Rushton's claim that had he known of the 
inclusion of the excess land in the quitclaim deed, he 
would not have signed the deed. The letter also 
restated the Rushtons' claim that they were never paid 
for the value of the land condemned by the County. In 
closing, Myrna wrote. "With this further information in 
your hands, I ask that you reconsider and agree to a 
corrected QCD [quitclaim deed] on this property." 
^ 12 Neither of the letters expressed an intent to file 
suit against the County or to resort to legal action if the 
matter was not resolved. Furthermore, while the 
names of Myrna and Owen were typed at the end of the 
letters, neither letter was signed. 
K 13 On March 13, 1996, approximately eighteen 
months after Myrna addressed the Board, Rushton filed 
an action in Third District Court, seeking a writ of 
mandamus ordering the County to convey the excess 
acreage to him. Rushton claimed he signed the 
quitclaim deed only because he believed the property 
had been condemned by an order of the court. He 
contended that, but for that belief, he would not have 
executed the deed that incorporated not only the 
original parcel of land the County condemned but also 
the excess acreage. Moreover, Rushton claimed he 
was never paid for either the original parcel of land or 
the excess acreage. 
1 14 The County moved to dismiss the action, 
claiming that Rushton failed to file a notice of claim 
with the County, as required by the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act (the "Immunity Act"), and that 
Rushton's action was barred by the statute of 
limitations. On December 22, 1997, the trial court 
granted the County's motion and dismissed Rushton's 
complaint on the ground that he failed to comply with 
the notice provisions of the Immunity Act. 
If 15 On appeal, Rushton argues that the letters 
presented to the Board met the statutory requirements 
of notice prior to filing suit and that, therefore, the 
district court erred in granting the County's motion to 
dismiss. In response, the County argues that the notice 
requirements of the Immunity Act require strict 
compliance and that Rushton's letters did not meet the 
mandatory requirements of the Act. The County 
argues that even if we were to deem the Rushtons' 
letters to be sufficient notice of their claim against the 
County, Rushton's action would be barred because he 
did not file his action within the time frame specified 
by the Immunity Act. Furthermore, the County argues 
that Rushton's action for payment for the land he 
conveyed to the County is time-barred. 
% 16 The issue before this court is whether the 
district court erred in granting the County's motion to 
dismiss on the ground that Rushton failed to comply 
with the notice provisions of the Immunity Act. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] lj 17 The proper interpretation of a statute is a 
question of law. See Johnson v. Redevelopment 
Agency, 913 P.2d 723, 727 (Utah 1995). Therefore, 
when reviewing an order of dismissal involving the 
interpretation of a statute, we accord no deference to 
the legal conclusions of the district court but review 
them for correctness. See id. 
ANALYSIS 
[2] U 18 To bring suit against a governmental entity 
for an injury, a party must file a written notice of claim 
with that entity. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2) 
(Supp.1998). Failure to file such notice deprives the 
court of subject matter jurisdiction. See Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988). 
[3] If 19 A notice of claim must include "(i) a brief 
statement of the facts; (ii) the nature of the claim 
asserted; and (iii) the damages incurred by the 
claimant so far as they are known." Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-1 l(3)(a). We have consistently required strict 
compliance with the requirements of the Immunity Act. 
Actual notice does not cure a party's failure to meet 
these requirements. See, e.g., Larson v. Park City 
Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 345 (Utah 1998); Shunk v. 
State, 924 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah 1996); H204. 
Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990); 
Yates v. Vernal Family Health Ctr, 617 P.2d 352. 354 
(Utah 1980); Scarborough v. Granite Sch. Dist., 531 
P.2d 480,482 (Utah 1975). 
[4] T 20 A notice of claim provides the entity being 
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sued with the factual details of the incident that led to 
the plaintiffs claim. Moreover, it "provide[s] the 
governmental entity an opportunity to correct the 
condition that caused the injury, evaluate the claim, and 
perhaps settle the matter without the expense of 
litigation." Larson, 955 P.2d at 345-46. 
[5] If 21 Rushton asserts he filed sufficient notice of 
his claim against the County in the form of the letters 
Myrna hand-delivered to the Board on September 14 
and 15 of 1994. We disagree. A review of the letters 
reveals that neither letter sufficiently set forth the 
nature of the claim asserted for statutory purposes. 
While the letters set forth the facts surrounding the 
boundary dispute, neither letter was presented to the 
Board as a notice of claim. Furthermore, they were not 
worded so as to alert the Board or the County to any 
impending legal action. In fact, there was no mention 
of the Rushtons' intention to seek any judicial remedy. 
Rather, the letters simply requested the County's 
assistance in settling the boundary dispute so the 
Rushtons could proceed with the development of their 
property. Such a request is not sufficient to state the 
nature of the claim asserted or to put the County on 
notice that a claim is being asserted against it. 
Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing 
Rushton's complaint against the County for failure to 
comply with the notice requirements of the Immunity 
Act. (FN5) 
[6] \ 22 Furthermore, Rushton's action fails 
because he did not file it within the time period 
prescribed in Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-14 & -15. 
After a valid notice of claim is filed, the governmental 
entity or its insurance carrier has ninety days in which 
to approve or deny the claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-14. If at the end of the ninety days the claim has 
not been approved or denied, it is deemed to be denied. 
See id. Once the claim is denied, a party has one year 
in which to initiate an action. See id. § 63-30-15. In 
the present case, Rushton argues he filed a valid notice 
of claim in September of 1994. However, Rushton did 
not file his action until March 13, 1996. one and a half 
years later. Therefore, even assuming there was a valid 
notice of claim, Rushton did not file his action within 
one year after the claim was either denied or deemed to 
be denied. Therefore, his action must fail. 
CONCLUSION 
% 23 We Jiffirm the district court's dismissal of 
Rushton's complaint against the County. 
f 24 Associate Chief Justice DURHAM and Justice 
ZIMMERMAN concur in Justice RUSSOWs opinion. 
HOWE, Chief Justice, concurring in the result: 
f 25 I concur in the result. I write to point out that 
in his complaint, Rushton sought both money damages 
and an order ithat the County reconvey to him the 
property described in the quitclaim deed in excess of 
the .53 acres that he claims he intended to convey and 
that the County intended to buy. To the extent that his 
suit constituted an equitable claim against the County, 
it would not be subject to the Immunity Act. Bennett v. 
Bow Valley Dev. Corp., 797 P.2d 419, 422 (Utah 
1990). However, Rushton did not argue that he had an 
equitable claim either in the district court or in his brief 
on appeal. He apparently first made that assertion in 
his oral argument before this court. That came too late 
since the County had no opportunity to respond. 
126 Justice STEWART dissents. 
(FN1.) Rushton's quitclaim deed was recorded with 
the Salt Lake County Recorder on May 20, 1970. 
(FN2.) The County made several requests to the 
Rushtons to keep the excess property free of weeds 
and debris. On one occasion, when the Rushtons 
failed to mountain the property to the County's 
satisfaction, the County performed the work itself 
and then billed the Rushtons for its efforts. 
(FN3.) On June 9, 1993, Rushton appointed his wife 
Myrna as his attorney-in-fact for purposes of 
litigation. It was in this capacity that she addressed 
the Board. 
(FN4.) In referring to the "original court order," 
Myrna probably meant to refer to the condemnation 
resolution of 1967. 
*1204_ (FN5.) We also note that neither letter was 
signed. Rather, the names of Myrna and Owen 
were typed at the end of the letter. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b) (Supp.1998) ("The notice 
of claim shall be: (i) signed by the person making 
the claim or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or 
legal guardianf.]"). 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Julie and Emilio MORENO, Plaintiffs and 
Appellees, 
v. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE JORDAN 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, Jordan 
School District, and John Does I-X, Defendants 
and 
Appellees. 
Laura Bartlett, individually and as representative 
of the 
heirs of Bill Bartlett, deceased, Intervenor and 
Appellant 
No. 950185. 
Nov. 8, 1996. 
After school district denied child's legal guardians* 
notice of claim, which sought recovery for child's 
drowning, guardians sued school district's Board of 
Education for wrongful death. Child's mother moved 
to intervene as party plaintiff. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F. Wilkinson, J., 
denied Board's motion for summary judgment as 
against guardians, and denied mother's motion to 
intervene. Mother appealed. The Supreme Court 
Russon, J., held that guardians could not maintain 
wrongful death action on their own behalf, but only in 
behalf of child's heirs. In separate opinion by Howe, 
J., the court held that guardians' notice of claim was 
legally sufficient to support mother's maintenance of 
wrongful death action. 
Reversed and remanded. 
30k842(2) 
Questions Are of Law or 
of Fact 
Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
J. 
Zimmerman, C.J., concurred in opinion by Russon, 
Howe, J., filed separate opinion in which Stewart, 
Associate C.J., and Durham, J., concurred. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and Error ®^842(2) 
30 -— 
30XVI Review 
30XVT(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered . 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
[See headnote text below] 
[1] Appeal and Error <©=* 1008.1(5) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact Verdicts, and 
Findings 
30XVI(I)3 Findings of Court 
30k 1008 Conclusiveness in General 
30k 1008.1 In General 
30k 1008.1 (5) Clearly Erroneous 
Findings. 
Supreme Court reviews trial court's legal 
conclusions nondeferentially for correctness and its 
factual determinations for clear error. 
[2] Statutes @=^  1XK 
361 — 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k 187 Meaning of Language 
361kl88 In General. 
Statute is generally construed according to its plain 
language. 
[3] Statutes <©==> 189 
361 — 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
36 Ik 187 Meaning of Language 
36 Ik 189 Literal and Grammatical 
Interpretation. 
[See headnote text below] 
[3] Statutes @=*212.6 
361 — 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
36 lk212 Presumptions to Aid Construction 
361k212.6 Words Used. 
Court assumes that each term in statute was used 
advisedly; thus, statutory words are read literally, 
unless such reading is unreasonably confused or 
inoperable. 
[4] Statutes <§==> 184 
361 — 
361V1 Construction and Operation 
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361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361kl80 Intention of Legislature 
36 Ik 184 Policy and Purpose of Act. 
[See headnote text below] 
[4] Statutes @=>217.4 
361 — 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k213 Extrinsic Aids to Construction 
361k217.4 Legislative History in General. 
Only when court finds ambiguity in statute's plain 
language must court seek guidance from legislative 
history and relevant policy determinations. 
[5] Statutes <®^ 183 
361 — 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361kl80 Intention of Legislature 
361kl83 Spirit or Letter of Law. 
[See headnote text below] 
[5] Statutes <@=^ 206 
361 — 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 V1(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic 
Aids to Construction 
361k206 Giving Effect to Entire Statute. 
[See headnote text below] 
[5] Statutes <@=>208 
361 — 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic 
Aids to Construction 
361k208 Context and Related Clauses. 
One cardinal principle of statutory construction is 
that courts will look to reason, spirit and sense of 
legislation, as indicated by entire context and subject 
matter of statute dealing with subject. 
[6] Death ®=>32 
117 — 
117III Actions for Causing Death 
117111(A) Right of Action and Defenses 
117k32 Persons for Whose Benefit Suit May Be 
Maintained. 
[See headnote text below] 
[6] Guardian and Ward ©^118 
196 — 
196 V Actions 
196kl 18 Rights of Action by Guanlian or Ward 
or Both. 
Statute that permits parents or guardian to maintain 
action for wrongful death of child does not permit 
guardian to maintain action in his own behalf, but only 
in behalf of child's heirs. U.C.A.1953,78-11-6. 
[7] Death <©^31(1) 
117 — 
117III Actions for Causing Death 
117111(A) Right of Action and Defenses 
117k31 Persons Entitled to Sue 
117k31(1) In General. 
[See headnote text below] 
[7] Death <@=*32 
117 — 
117III Actions for Causing Death 
117111(A) Right of Action and Defenses 
117k32 Persons for Whose Benefit Suit May 
Be Maintained. 
[See headnote text below] 
[7] Guardian and Ward <®^22 
196 — 
196II Appointment, Qualification, and Tenure of 
Guardian 
196k22 Death of Ward. 
[See headnote text below] 
[7] Guardian and Ward <@=^  118 
196 — 
196 V Actions 
196kl 18 Rights of Action by Guardian or Ward 
or Both. 
While rights and responsibilities of guardian 
flowing out of legal custody of ward terminate upon 
death of ward, guardian's ability to maintain action for 
wrongful death of minor flows from guardian's residual 
duty of accounting and does not terminate upon minor's 
death; this obligation is not for personal benefit of 
guardian, but is among guardian's residual duties upon 
death of his ward, and therefore any wrongful death 
action must be brought in behalf of ward's heirs. 
U.C.A.1953,75-5-210,78-11-6. 
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[8] Appeal and Error @=*854(1) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k851 Theory and Grounds of Decision of 
Lower Court 
30k854 Reasons for Decision 
30k854(l) In General. 
Supreme Court may affirm trial court's decision on 
any ground. 
[9] Schools <©=* 112 
345 — 
345II Public Schools 
34511(1) Claims Against District 
345kll2 Presentation and Allowance of 
Claims. 
Child's legal guardians' notice of claim to school 
arising from child's death was sufficient to notify 
school of child's mother's claim, thus enabling her to 
maintain wrongful death action against school, even 
though guardians' notice of claim sought to recover in 
their own behalf and did not even mention mother; 
notice of claim fulfilled purpose of Governmental 
Immunity Act's notice of claim provision, as notice was 
timely filed, set out facts and nature of claim, and 
stated damages incurred by claimant "so far as they are 
known." U.C.A.1953,63-30-1 l(3)(a). 
P/C per Justice Howe's separate opinion 
*887 Julian D. Jensen, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs. 
Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., Donald H. Hansen, Brent 
A. Burnett, Asst. Attys. Gen., Salt Lake City, for school 
district parties. 
Richard I. Ashton, David A. Wilde, Murray, for 
intervenor. 
RUSSON, Justice: 
Laura Bartlett appeals from the trial court's denial 
of her motion to intervene in the action for wrongful 
death of her minor son Bill Bartlett, brought by her 
son's legal custodians and guardians, Julie and Emilio 
Moreno, against the Board of Education of the Jordan 
School District and the Jordan School District 
(collectively, the School District). The trial court 
denied Bartlett's motion to intervene on the ground that 
the Morenos, not Bartlett, were the real party in 
interest. The trial court further concluded that any 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 
residual parental rights Bartlett had after losing custody 
of her son terminated at her son's death. We reverse. 
FACTS 
Julie and Emilio Moreno provided foster care for 
Bill Bartlett commencing approximately March 1983. 
when he was five years old. In November 1991, by 
order of the Third District Juvenile Court, the Morenos 
were awarded permanent custody and guardianship of 
Bill. However, the Morenos never adopted Bill, nor 
were Bill's mother's parental rights terminated. Bill 
resided with the Morenos for approximately nine years 
until his death in June 1992 after drowning in the 
swimming pool at West Jordan Middle School. 
In December 1992. the Morenos filed a notice of 
claim with the School District pursuant to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 
63-30-1 to -38, alleging that the negligence of the 
School District and its employees proximately caused 
Bill's death. Further, the Morenos claimed that as Bill's 
legal and exclusive guardians, they were entitled to 
bring an action and recover damages in their own 
behalf for Bill's wrongful death pursuant to section 
78-11-6 of the Utah Code. That section provides: 
[A] parent or guardian may maintain an action for 
the death or injury of a minor child when the injury 
or death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another. 
The Morenos sought special medical damages in 
the amount of $87,543.39, funeral and personal losses 
of $10,000, and compensation for loss of love, 
affection, comfort, and society in the amount of 
$750,000. The notice of claim did not name—or even 
mention—Bill's natural mother, Laura Bartlett. 
In September 1993. the School District denied the 
Morenos' claim on the basis that a guardian is not 
permitted to recover for the wrongful death of a ward 
and, further, that a guardian's appointment terminates 
upon the death of the ward. The Morenos subsequently 
filed a civil complaint in district court against the 
School District, alleging that its negligent acts and 
policies had proximately caused Bill's wrongful death. 
The Morenos further alleged that as Bill's permanent 
legal guardians and custodians, they were bringing this 
action in their own behalf pursuant to section 78-11-6. 
Again, Bill's natural mother was not named or joined in 
the complaint. 
In January 1994, the School District moved for 
claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
926 P.2d 886, Moreno v. Board of Educ. of Jordan School Dist., (Utah 19%) Page 4 
summary judgment. It alleged that the Morenos had no 
legal standing to bring their wrongful death action 
because they were not Bill's heirs, but merely his 
guardians. 
In January 1995, during the pendency of the School 
District's motion for summary judgment Bartlett 
moved to intervene in the action pursuant to rule 24(a) 
of the Utah *888 Rules of Civil Procedure, claiming 
that she, as Bill's natural mother, was the real part) in 
interest and that the Morenos were not. The School 
District opposed the motion, arguing that Bartlett's 
claim was time-barred for failure to file a timely notice 
of claim as required by the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. The Morenos also opposed Bartlett's 
motion, asserting that under section 78-11-6, either a 
parent or a guardian can bring a claim in their own 
behalf for the wrongful death of a minor, but not both. 
In addition, the Morenos argued that they were, in fact, 
Bill's true "parents'1 and care-givers and. furthermore, 
that Bartlett had abandoned Bill many years before. 
Thus, they argued, Bartlett's motion to intervene should 
be denied. 
In March 1995, the trial court denied the School 
District's motion for summary judgment against the 
Morenos, holding that the Morenos had the authority to 
bring this wrongful death action in their own behalf. 
The trial court also denied Bartlett's motion to 
intervene as a party plaintiff, reasoning that the 
Morenos, not Bartlett, were the real party in interest in 
the wrongful death action by virtue of their permanent 
custody and guardianship of Bill and that even if 
Bartlett had retained parental rights after the Morenos 
were awarded permanent custody and guardianship, 
those rights terminated at Bill's death. Bartlett now 
appeals from the trial court's denial of her motion to 
intervene. The School District did not appeal from the 
denial of its motion for summary judgment but is an 
appellee in Bartlett's appeal. 
On appeal, Bartlett argues that only an heir, not a 
guardian, can recover for the wrongful death of a minor 
child and, thus, the trial court erred in denying her 
motion to intervene in the action. Bartlett further 
argues that the Morenos had acted as her representative 
in filing their claim against the School District and, 
therefore, under rules 17 and 24(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, her intervention is timely and 
proper. Finally, she asserts that a neglectfel parent is 
not barred from recovery for the wrongful death of her 
child, although issues of neglect may bear' upon the 
damages she is entitled to recover. 
The Morenos respond that as Bill's guardians, the) 
have a right to recover in their own behalf under 
section 78-11-6 for the wrongful death of their minor 
ward. In addition, they argue that an abandoning 
natural parent should be precluded from recovering 
under a wrongful death statute for the death of her 
abandoned child. 
The School District responds that the Morenos 
cannot personally recover damages in their own behalf 
for Bill's wrongful death because (1) only heirs can 
recover for the wrongful death of a child, and guardians 
are not heirs, and (2) Bartlett's parental rights had 
never been terminated and she was still Bill's rightful 
heir and thus entitled to bring an action as Bill's heir. 
However, the School District argues that Bartlett's 
claim was barred for failure to timely file a notice of 
her claim as required by the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act and, therefore, the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction over her claim. 
ANALYSIS 
[1] The issue before us is whether the trial court 
erred in denying Bartlett's motion to intervene in the 
Morenos' action pursuant to rule 24(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
By the terms of [rule 24(a) ], an applicant must be 
allowed to intervene if four requirements are met: 
1) the application is timely; 2) the applicant has an 
interest in the subject matter of the dispute; 3) that 
interest is or may be inadequately represented, and 
4) the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment 
in the action. 
Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279, 282 (Utah 1982) 
. Such a determination may involve questions of both 
law and fact. We review a trial court's legal 
conclusions nondeferentially for correctness and its 
factual determinations for clear error. State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
[2][3][4][5] Section 78-11-6 of the Utah Code 
establishes who may be a plaintiff in an action to 
recover for the wrongful death or injury of a child. 
This section provides in relevant part: 
[A] parent or guardian may maintain an action for 
the death or injury of a minor *889 child when the 
injury or death is caused by the wrongful act or 
neglect of another. 
In interpreting section 78-11-6, this court is guided 
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by the principle that a statute is generally construed 
according to its plain language. State v. A House and 
1. 37 Acres of Real Property located at 392 South 600 
East, 886 P.2d 534, 537 (Utah 1994). We assume that 
"each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the 
statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading 
is unreasonably confused or inoperable." Savage 
Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 
670 (Utah 1991). In addition, "[w]ords and phrases 
are to be construed according to the context and the 
approved usage of the language." Utah Code Ann. § 
68-3-11. "Only when we find ambiguity in the statute's 
plain language must we seek guidance from the 
legislative history and relevant policy determinations." 
World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency 
Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994). Finally, " 
'[o]ne of the cardinal principles of statutory 
construction is that the courts will look to the reason, 
spirit and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the 
entire context and subject matter of the statute dealing 
with the subject.' " Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Payne, 782 P.2d 464. 466 (Utah 1989) (quoting 
Masich v. U.S. Smelting, 113 Utah 101, 108, 191 P.2d 
612,616(1948)). 
[6] Section 78-11-6 states that a parent or guardian 
may maintain an action for the wrongful death of a 
child. The section is silent, however, on whether a 
guardian may maintain an action in his own behalf or 
only in behalf of the child's heirs. Thus, we look to 
adjacent provisions for guidance in interpreting this 
section. See Beirett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P. 2d 
367. 369 (Utah 1994) (examining preceding section to 
interpret scope of particular term). 
Section 78-11-7 of the Utah Code provides for 
recovery7 for the death or injury of an adult. This 
section is more explicit as to who can bring a claim. 
This section provides in relevant part: 
[W]hen the death of a person not a minor is caused 
by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs, 
or his personal representatives for the benefit of his 
heirs, may maintain an action for damages against 
the person causing the death.... If such adult person 
has a guardian at the time of his death, only one 
action can be maintained for the injury to or death 
of such person, and such action may be brought 
by either the personal representatives of such 
adult deceased person, for the benefit of his heirs, 
or by such guardian for the benefit of his heirs as 
provided in the next preceding section [section 
78-11-6]. In every action under this and the next 
preceding section [section 78-11-6] such damages 
may be given as under all the circumstances of the 
case may be just. 
Utah Code Ann. J 78-11-7 (1992) (emphasis 
added). 
Under section 78-11-7. it is clear that the wrongful 
death action of an adult can be maintained only by the 
deceased's heirs or by the representative or guardian of 
such person in behalf oj the heirs. Further, section 
78-11-7 states that the action may be brought by the 
guardian in behalf of the heirs "as provided in the next 
preceding section [section 78-11-6]." Thus, the 
provisions regarding who may sue and in whose behalf 
they may recover under section 78-11-7 apply to suits 
under section 78-11-6 by explicit reference to that 
section in section 78-11-7. See also Jones v. Carve11, 
641 P.2d 105. 107 (Utah 1982) (applying language 
from section 78-11-7 to determine scope of damages 
recoverable for wrongful death of child). 
This interpretation comports with the statutes 
concerning the rights and obligations of parents in 
contrast to the rights and obligations of guardians with 
respect to their ward. "The court may appoint a 
guardian for an unemancipated minor if all parental 
rights of custody have been terminated or suspended 
by circumstances or prior court order." Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-5-204 (emphasis added). However, even 
after the parental right of custody has been terminated 
and physical custody of the child is placed in a 
guardian, the parent retains certain rights with respect 
to the child: 
"Residual parental rights and duties" means those 
rights and duties remaining with the parent after 
legal custody or guardianship, or both, have been 
vested in *890 another person or agency, 
including, but not limited to, the responsibility for 
support, the right to consent to adoption, the right to 
determine the child's religious affiliation, and the 
right to reasonable visitation unless restricted by the 
court. If no guardian has been appointed, "residual 
parental rights and duties" also include the right to 
consent to marriage, to enlistment, and to consent to 
major medical, surgical, or psychiatric treatment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-2(18) (1992). Other 
residual parental rights include the right to inherit from 
a child and vice versa. Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-103, 
and the right to maintain an action for the wrongful 
death of a child, Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6. See also 
In re IP., 648 P.2d 1364, 1366 n. 1 (Utah 1982) 
(enumerating residual parental rights). Thus, the 
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parent retains the responsibility to support the child as 
well as certain rights including the right to visitation, 
allowing the parent the possibility of maintaining a 
meaningful relationship with the child despite lack of 
physical custody. Furthermore, there is a distinct 
procedure for the termination of all parental rights. See 
Utah Code Ann §§ 78-3a-401 to -414 (Supp.1996). 
On the other hand the rights and responsibilities of 
a guardian are premised on the right to physical 
custody of the child: 
"Legal custody" means a relationship embodying 
the following rights and duties: 
(a) the right to physical custody of a child; 
(b) the right and duty to protect, train, and 
discipline him; 
(c) the duty to provide him with food, clothing, 
shelter, education, and ordinary medical care; 
(d) the right to determine where and with whom 
he shall live; and 
(e) the right, in an emergency, to authorize 
surgery or other extraordinary care. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-2(14) (1992); see also 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-209 (powers and duties of 
guardian of minor). 
Furthermore, "[a] guardian's authority and 
responsibility terminates ... upon the minor's death, 
adoption, marriage, or attainment of majority, but 
termination does not affect his liability for prior acts 
[or] his obligation to account for funds and assets of his 
ward." Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-210. Thus, while the 
guardian retains such general duties as accounting for 
the ward, no personal rights or responsibilities of the 
guardian continue after the ward's death. 
[7] Consistent with section 75-5-210, we hold that 
while the rights and responsibilities of a guardian 
flowing out of legal custody of the ward terminate upon 
the death of the ward, the guardian's ability to maintain 
an action for the wrongful death of a minor flows from 
the guardian's residual duty of accounting and does not 
terminate upon the minor's death. This obligation is 
not for the personal benefit of the guardian, but is 
among a guardian's residual duties upon the death of 
his ward, and therefore any wrongfid death action must 
be brought in behalf of the ward's heirs. Accordingly, 
we find that the Morenos' argument that they can 
maintain an action for Bill's wrongful death in their 
own behalf is not supported by the statutes at issue. 
[8] The School District argues that even though 
Bartlett is the real party in interest her claim is barred 
for failure to file a notice of claim within one year of 
the injury, pursuant to the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. Therefore, it argues, we should affirm 
the trial court's denial of her motion to intervene on this 
ground. Although the School District raised this 
argument below, the trial court denied Bartlett's motion 
on the basis that the Morenos, not Bartlett were the 
real parties in interest in this action. However, we may 
affirm the trial court's decision on any ground. White v. 
Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Utah 1994). 
Bartlett argues that the notice of claim filed by the 
Morenos was filed in a representative capacity for and 
in behalf of Bill's heirs and, thus, the School District 
was notified of her claim pursuant to the requirements 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Bartlett 
additionally argues that pursuant to rule 17 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, she may be substituted for 
the Morenos as a party in the wrongful death action, 
thereby also substituting herself as the claimant under 
*891 the Act The School District argues, on the 
other hand, that strict compliance with the Act requires 
that Bartlett independently file a notice of her claim and 
that Bartlett cannot evade compliance with this 
requirement by intervening in the Morenos' action. 
Section 63-30-13 of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act provides. 
A claim agaimst a political subdivision, or against 
its employee; for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within the 
scope of employment, or under color of authority, is 
barred unless notice of claim is filed with the 
governing body of the political subdivision within 
one year after the claim arises. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In this case, the School District is a political 
subdivision. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(7) 
(defining "[p]olitical subdivision" to include "school 
district"). Bill's injury occurred on May 22, 1992, and 
he died on June 2, 1992. Thus, prior to bringing the 
action for Bill's wrongful death, the Morenos, if they 
were the appropriate party, were required under the 
Act to file a notuce of claim with the School District 
within one year of his death, i.e., by June 2, 1993. See 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S Govt, works 
926 P.2d 886, Moreno v. Board of Educ. of Jordan School Dist.. (Utah 19%) Page 7 
Nelson v. Logan City, 103 Utah 356, 368-69. 135 P.2d 
259, 265 (1943) (holding that statute begins to run on 
date of death for wrongful death claim). The Morenos 
complied with the notice requirement by filing a notice 
of claim with the School District on December 3, 
1992. However, Bartlett did not independently file a 
notice of claim with the School District and did not 
move to intervene in the Morenos' action until January 
1995, well beyond the time permitted by the statutory 
notice requirement. Thus, the resolution of this issue 
turns on whether the Morenos' notice of claim satisfies 
Bartlett's notice requirement under the Act. 
The Governmental Immunity Act has been strictly 
construed by Utah courts. In Scarborough v. Granite 
School District, 531 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1975), this 
court stated in reference to the notice requirement 
under the Act, "We have consistently held that where a 
cause of action is based upon a statute, full compliance 
with its requirements is a condition precedent to the 
right to maintain a suit." 
Bartlett argues that because the Morenos filed 
notice of their claim, the School District was properly 
notified as to her claim. However, the Morenos' notice 
of claim clearly states that the Morenos sought to 
maintain a claim in their own behalf, not in a 
representative capacity for Bartlett or Bill's heirs. In 
fact the Morenos' notice of claim specifically states: 
[T]he Morenos, as the sole and exclusive guardians 
and foster parents for the minor child, are fully 
entitled to bring an action for wrongful death 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-11-6. The Morenos are further convinced that 
the Utah law will entitle them to recover damages 
for all monetary amounts incurred by them related 
to the accident and for the loss of the love, 
affection, and society of the minor child. 
While it is difficult to measure such losses, we 
have attempted to itemize below the losses which 
we believe the Morenos, as the legal and exclusive 
guardians, and in loco parentis, are entitled to 
recover. 
(Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Further, the 
notice of claim, which included a copy of the order 
awarding permanent custody and guardianship of Bill 
to the Morenos, does not even mention Bartlett. 
Moreover, the School District clearly denied the 
Morenos' claim on the basis that they brought the claim 
in their own behalf, not on Bartlett's behalf. The letter 
of denial stated that"(1) a guardian is not an heir of the 
minor and is not entitled to inherit a share of the 
minor's estate when the minor dies, and (2) the 
appointment of a guardian terminates upon the minor's 
death." 
Therefore, this author would conclude that the 
notice of claim filed by the Morenos for damages in 
their own behalf clearly was not sufficient to notify the 
School District of Bartlett's claim. However, a 
majority of the court agrees with Justice Howe's 
separate opinion that the notice provided by the 
Morenos was legally sufficient to notify the School 
District of Bartlett's claim. 
*892. CONCLUSION 
We reverse the trial court's denial of Bartlett's 
motion to intervene and hold that Bartlett, not the 
Morenos, is the real party' in interest. We further hold 
that the notice provided by the Morenos was legally 
sufficient to notify the School District of Bartlett's 
claim. Accordingly, we remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., concurs. 
HOWE, Justice, separate opinion: 
[9] I concur in that part of the lead opinion which 
holds that when a guardian brings a wrongful death 
action for the death of his ward, it is brought on behalf 
of the ward's heirs and not for the personal benefit of 
the guardian. However, I dissent as to that part which 
holds that the instant action brought by the Morenos 
must be dismissed because the notice of claim given to 
the School District was defective. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a) provides that a 
notice of claim shall contain (1) a brief statement of the 
facts, (2) the nature of the claim asserted, and (3) the 
damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are 
known. The purpose of a notice of claim is to give 
timely notice of the above requirements so that the 
state or one of its political subdivisions may conduct an 
investigation. In this case, that purpose was fulfilled. 
The notice of claim given by the Morenos stated the 
facts surrounding Bill's drowning and made claim for 
his wrongful death. Amounts of damage were stated 
for his hospitalization, medical care, funeral, and loss 
of companionship. Because the Morenos were 
laboring under a mistake of law, they claimed damages 
fortheir loss of companionship rather than for the heir's 
loss. 
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We hold that the notice of claim is sufficient to 
support the wrongful death action filed by the Morenos 
even though we have now decided that Bill's heirs, not 
the Morenos, are the beneficiaries. Since section 
78-11-6 authorizes a guardian to maintain an action for 
the wrongful death of his ward, it follows that the 
guardian has the authority to file the prerequisite notice 
of claim. The notice here was timely filed, set out the 
facts and the nature of the claim, and stated the 
damages incurred by the claimant "so far as they are 
known." The Morenos, acting upon the advice of legal 
counsel and in good faith, erroneously claimed 
damages for their loss of companionship because of 
their misapprehension of the law. This should not be 
fatal since irrespective of who the beneficiaries of a 
wrongful death action are, the damages claimed for 
medical, hospitalization, and funeral costs do not 
change. Only the damages for loss of companionship 
might differ, [n fact because of Bartlett's detachment 
from Bill, her damages might well be less than those of 
the Morenos. Therefore, no prejudice can be shown to 
the School District because the claim was filed b\ the 
Morenos in their own behalf rather than in a 
representative capacity for Bartlett or Bill's heirs. 
We hold that the notice of claim given to the School 
District was legally sufficient to support the 
maintenance of this wrongful death action, although the 
Morenos mistakenly assumed that thev, not Bartlett. 
would be the beneficiaries of the action. 
STEWART, Associate C.J., and DURHAM, J., 
concur. 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jolene STAHL, PlaintifT and Appellant, 
v. 
UTA i ( TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a public agency, 
Defendant and Respondent 
No. 16419. 
Sept. 12, 1980. 
Motorist brought action against public transit 
authority to recover damages sustained in automobile 
accident involving a bus owned by the authority and 
driven by one of its employees. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Christine M. Durham, J., 
entered judgment of default due to plaintiffs failure to 
comply with statutory notice provision, and plaintiff 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that 
motorist substantially complied with the statute by 
furnishing signed accident report and medical release 
to defendant's insurance adjuster, who acted as 
defendant's agent. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Statutes <@^223.1 
361 — 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 V1(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k223 Construction with Reference to 
Other Statutes 
36lk223.1 In General. 
Statutory provision must be construed so as to 
make it harmonious with other statutes relevant to the 
subject matter. 
[2] Statutes <@^ =>227 
361 — 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k227 Construction as Mandatory or 
Directory. 
Generally, a direction in a statute to do an act is 
considered "mandatory" when consequences are 
attached to the failure to act; conversely, when a 
statute requires an action to be taken without 
prescribing a penalty for failure to so act, the 
requirement is not often deemed mandatory. 
[3] Statutes <®=* 184 
361 — 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
36 Ik 180 Intention of Legislature 
36 Ik 184 Policy and Purpose of Act. 
A statute is to be construed in light of its intended 
purpose. 
[4] Automobiles <@=>230 
48A — 
48AV Injuries from Operation, or Use of 
Highway 
48AV(B) Actions 
48Ak230 Notice of Claim for Injury. 
Motorist who was involved in automobile accident 
allegedly caused by bus owned by public transit 
authority, substantially complied with statutory notice 
provision by supplying signed accident form and 
medical release to authority's insurance adjuster, who 
was authorized by law to handle approval or denial of 
victim's claim and thus acted as agent of the authority. 
U.C.A.1953. 11-20-56. 
Wendall E. Bennett, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
appellant. 
Rex J. Hanson, David H. Epperson, Salt Lake City, 
for defendant and respondent. 
STEWART, Justice: 
On September 9, 1976, in Salt Lake City a bus 
owned by the Utah Transit Authority ("UTA") and 
driven by a UTA employee collided with the rear end 
of an automobile which in turn collided head-on with 
an automobile driven by the plaintiff. The plaintiff was 
taken to the Valley West Hospital for examination. 
Upon returning to work that same day plaintiff was 
contacted by Thomas Vance, an insurance adjuster for 
Brown Brothers Insurance, which represents UTA's 
insurer. Transit Casualty. He obtained a statement 
from her concerning the accident and wrote a two-page 
report based on her answers to his inquiries. Vance 
also had plaintiff sign a statement and a medical 
information release allowing her personal physician to 
disclose information to him. 
On December 28, 1976, after 31/2 months had 
elapsed with no action by the insurance company or 
UTA, plaintiff retained counsel. The following day 
counsel sent a written notice of claim to the Utah 
Transit Authority and to the Utah Attorney General. 
Suit was filed in district court July 14, 1977. 
On motion the case was dismissed without 
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prejudice. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint, 
along with depositions of herself and the insurance 
adjuster, Vance. UTA moved for summary judgment 
for failure to comply with s 11-20-56 U.C.A., as 
amended, a part of the Utah Public Transit District Act. 
That section provides: 
Claims against district-Requirements.-Eveiy 
claim against the district for *481 death, injury or 
damage alleged to have been caused by the 
negligent act or omission of the district shall be 
presented to the board of directors in writing within 
thirty7 days after the death, injury, or damage, signed 
and verified by the claimant or his duly authorized 
agent, stating the time and place where the injury or 
damage occurred and a general statement of the 
cause and circumstances of the death, injury or 
damages. No action under this section shall be 
commenced until sixty days after presentation, or 
unless the board of directors shall sooner deny 
claim. (Emphasis added.) 
On the basis of that statute a judgment of dismissal 
was entered, and this appeal ensued. For the purpose 
of this appeal we state the facts developed in discovery 
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff contends that the provision above cited 
was not intended to be a statute of limitations and that s 
63-30-12 of the Governmental Immunity Act provides 
the relevant statute of limitation in this case. Plaintiff 
also contends that UTA is estopped from relying on s 
11-20-56 as a result of the actions of the insurance 
adjustor. 
(1) Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 
100, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971), held that it is for the 
judiciary to assume that each term of a statute was 
advisedly adopted by the Legislature. It is also our 
duty to construe a statutory provision so as to make it 
harmonious with other statutes relevant to the subject 
matter. The language in the Utah Public Transit 
District Act stands in direct contrast to the general 
notice of claim provision found in the Governmental 
Immunity Act enacted in 1965, four years prior to the 
Public Transit Act. The Governmental Immunity Act 
makes clear that a failure to comply with the notice 
provision results in a bar to prosecution of the action. 
Section 63-30-12, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as 
amended, provides that: 
Claim against state or agency-Notice to attorney 
general and agency-Time for filing.-A claim against 
the state or any agency thereof as defined herein 
shall be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed 
with the attorney general of the state of Utah and 
the agency concerned within one year after the 
cause of action arises. (Emphasis added.) 
Section 63-30-13 includes the same mandatory 
language in prescribing the penalty for noncompliance 
with the notice: requirement regarding claims against 
political subdivisions. 
(2) We are guided in construing the language of the 
instant statute by the principle that generally7 a direction 
in a statute to do an act is considered "mandatory" 
when consequences are attached to the failure to act. 
Conversely, when a statute requires an action to be 
taken without prescribing a penalty for failure to so act, 
the requirement is not often deemed mandatory. 
Whitley v. Superior Ct., 18 Cal.2d 75, 113 P.2d 449 
(1941). See Barton v. Atkinson, 228 Ga. 733. 187 
S.E.2d 835 (1972); Paul v. City of Manhattan, 212 
Kan. 381, 511 P.2d 244 (1973); State ex rel. Ferro v. 
Oellermann, Mo., 458 S.W.2d 583 (1970); Dunker v. 
Brown County Bd. of Ed., 80 S.D. 193, 121 N.W.2d 
10 (1963); Chisholm v. Bewley Mills. 155 Tex. 400. 
287 S.W.2d 943 (1956); State ex rel. Werlein v. 
Elamore, 33 Wis.2d 288, 147 N.W.2d 252 (1967). 
Further assistance in this case is provided by 
viewing the pertinent language in light of our 
Legislature's choice of language construction in similar 
provisions. The difference thus uncovered signifies a 
purposeful selection and indicates the intended 
meaning. See Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, 96 Utah 450, 
85 P.2d 831 (1939); Canada Dry Bottling Co. v. Board 
of Review, 118 Utah 619, 223 P.2d 586 (1950); 
Ballou v. Kemp, 92 F.2d 556 (DC. Cir. 1937); 
Commonwealth v. Reick Investment Corp., 419 Pa. 52, 
213 A.2d 277 (1965). 
The express bar against maintaining an action for 
noncompliance with the notice provision in the 
Governmental Immunity Act, when compared with the 
Utah Public Transit District Act, which contains no 
such language, indicates an intent on the part of the 
Legislature not to impose a bar for *482 
noncompliance with the notice provision of the latter 
act. It is not for the Court to read into the statute an 
intention to establish a statute of limitations which is 
not expressly stated in the statute. 
The cases cited by defendant which hold a statutory 
notice requirement mandatory and a bar to filing an 
action without strict compliance with the time 
limitation involve statutory language which 
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unequivocally designates a legislative intent to have the 
failure to comply stand as a bar to further action. 
These cases therefore are not controlling in the instant 
case. See Crowder v. Salt Lake County, Utah, 552 
P.2d 646 (1976); Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 
27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972); Peterson v. Salt Lake City, 
118 Utah 231, 221 P.2d 591 (1950). 
Moreover, there was substantial compliance with 
the 30-day notice provision and defendant was in no 
way prejudiced by plaintiffs failure to comply with the 
formality of filing a claim. 
(3) A statute is, of course, to be construed in light 
of its intended purpose. Child v. City of Spanish Fork, 
Utah, 538 P.2d 184 (1975). It is necessary to consider 
the policy of the notice requirement so that in any 
particular case the facts can be evaluated to determine 
if the intent of the statute has been accomplished by 
substantial compliance with the statutory directive. 
Smith v. State, Ala., 364 So.2d 1 (1978). This Court 
has previously stated that the primary purpose of a 
notice of claim requirement is to afford the responsible 
public authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper 
and timely investigation of the merits of a claim and to 
arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby 
avoiding the expenditure of public revenue for costly 
and unnecessary litigation. Sears v. Southworth, Utah, 
563 P.2d 192 (1977); Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 
Utah 2d 27,492 P.2d 1335 (1972). 
We view plaintiffs contention that the notice given 
to the insurance adjuster in this case constituted 
compliance with the statute in light of these policy 
considerations. First, we note that s 63-30-14 of the 
Governmental Immunity Act equates the authority of 
the insurance carrier with that of the governmental 
entity concerning the notice to claimant of the approval 
or denial of a claim for injury. Thus the insurance 
agent is authorized by law to handle the approval or 
denial of plaintiffs claim, representing the interests of 
the government. Rice v. Granite School District 23 
Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969). Further, Vance 
testified in this case that all claims against UTA are 
handled directly by his office and specifically by 
himself. The record also reveals that UTA informed 
Vance of the accident shortly after its occurrence. He 
immediately contacted plaintiff on the same day as the 
accident, obtained a signed statement of her version of 
the incident, and received a medical release form from 
her. In light of these facts, Vance's actions in obtaining 
a signed statement of plaintiffs version of the accident 
were for all practical purposes the acts of UTA. 
(4) Clearly there was substantial compliance with 
the notice provision. No undue hardship resulted from 
the notice being given to an agent of the party named in 
the statute. Considering the duties delegated to the 
insurance agent, it appears that the person entrusted 
with the investigation and settlement procedures 
received the requisite information in a timely fashion 
and within the time constraints imposed by the statute. 
Furthermore, conceding there is some validity to the 
necessity of having a notice in writing to guard against 
the unreliability of memory, the information given was 
committed to writing in a two-page report and signed 
by plaintiff, thus recording plaintiffs account of the 
accident. 
A case closely in point with the ca^e at bar is 
Badger v. Upper Darby Township, 348 Pa. 551, 36 
A.2d 507 (1944). Plaintiffs counsel, within the 
prescribed period, gave written notice to the insurance 
carrier for the defendant township rather than the clerk 
or secretary of such municipality, as required by 
statute. The court, in allowing plaintiff to maintain an 
action for damages, declared: 
*483. In determining, in its discretion, whether a 
failure to file the notice prescribed by the act should 
be excused, a weight} circumstance to be 
considered by the court is whether or not the 
municipality has suffered any undue hardship. 
Here there is nothing to indicate that it did so suffer. 
Of controlling importance is the fact that within the 
prescribed period the insurance company was 
notified that claim was being made, was furnished 
with the essential facts in regard to the accident, 
and, by designating a physician to examine 
plaintiff, apparently admitted its responsibility to 
investigate the claim. If, as would appear, the 
insurance company is the real party in interest, a 
decision denying plaintiff the right to prosecute her 
claim because of failure to give written notice to the 
township would be one of sheer literalism, for, had 
such notice been given, the township would 
undoubtedly, in due course, have turned it over to 
the company to which plaintiffs counsel had sent it 
in the first instance. It is not unusual for lawyers 
representing claimants in accident cases to 
communicate with insurance companies directly 
rather than with defendants, since the former 
control the negotiations for settlement and prepare 
the defense in case of litigation. (Emphasis added.) 
(36 A.2d at 508-09.) 
The instant case is clearly distinguishable from 
Moran v. Salt Lake City, 53 Utah 407, 173 P. 702 
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(1918). In that case a notice was presented to a party 
other than the recipient prescribed by statute. The 
Court consequently found the notice to be inadequate. 
The Court in Moran specifically found that the board to 
whom notice had been given lacked authority to 
consider or settle damage claims against the city for 
any acts of negligence. In the instant case, as pointed 
above, the insurance carrier through its agent has 
specific authority to consider and settle damage claims. 
The cases cited by defendant in support of the 
contention that notice to the insurance agent does not 
comply with the notice requirement are distinguishable 
from the instant case. In those cases, the applicable 
statutes contained words of absolute prohibition as a 
consequence of noncompliance, thus suggesting a 
stricter standard of adherence. Sears v. Southworth, 
Utah, 563 R2d 192 (1977); Scarborough v. Granite 
School District, Utah, 531 P.2d 480 (1975); Varoz v. 
Sevey, 29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435 (1973); 
Roosendaal Construction and Mining Corp. v. Holman, 
28 Utah 2d 396, 503 P.2d 446 (1972). Furthermore, it 
should be noted in the instant case that plaintiff met the 
strict requirements placed on the cause of action by (1) 
the statute of limitation found in s 63-30-12 of the 
Governmental Immunity Act and (2) the prohibition 
against any action being brought until sixty days after 
presentation of notice found in s 11-20-56 of the Utah 
Page 4 
Public Transit District Act. 
Other couits have also construed similar statutory 
notice requirements to hold mat substantial compliance 
meets the statutory requirements even in the face of 
mandatory language. Ray v. City of Council Bluffs, 
193 Iowa 620, 187 NW. 447 (1922); Brickell v. 
Kansas City. 364 Mo. 679, 265 S.W.2d 342 (1954); 
Peterson v. Kansas City, 324 Mo. 454, 23 S.W.2d 
1045 (1930); Shaw v. City of New York, 83 AJD. 212, 
82N.Y.S.44(1903). 
In sum, the purpose of the notice requirement was 
satisfied. 
Plaintiffs second contention is that UTA is 
estopped from relying on the notice of claim 
requirement in light of the insurance adjuster's conduct. 
Whether the facts in this case support an estoppel or 
waiver theory need not be decided in light of the 
foregoing. 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a trial on 
the merits. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS, MAUGHAN 
and HALL, JJ., concur. 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Francine G. SCARBOROUGH, for herself and as 
guardian for 
Jeffrey Dean Scarborough, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a political 
subdivision of the 
State of Utah, Defendant and Respondent 
No. 13558. 
Feb. 3, 1975. 
Mother sought to recover for injuries sustained by 
12-year-old son when he fell while playing with dead 
wires dangling from utility poles on elementary school 
playground. The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., J., dismissed the action, 
and mother appealed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, 
J., held that conversation between mother and school 
principal in which principal allegedly stated wires 
were left in such condition by utility company, coupled 
with a report of principal's investigation filed with 
school district office, did not constitute a 'filing' of a 
claim that would meet requirements of statute 
governing time for filing claim against political 
subdivision and that alleged statement by principal that 
wires were left in such condition by utility company did 
not estop school district from asserting such statute as 
bar to cause of action, where principal did not make 
any representation that school district was responsible 
and where he told mother that he could not give any 
information or do anything about the situation and that 
the problem would have to be taken up with the school 
district office. 
Affirmed. 
Maughan, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Action @^>10 
13 — 
131 Grounds and Conditions Precedent 
13k 10 Conditions Precedent in General. 
Where cause of action is based upon statute, full 
compliance with its requirements is condition 
precedent to the right to maintain a suit. 
[2] Schools®^ 112 
345 — 
345II Public Schools 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 
34511(1) Claims Against District 
345kll2 Presentation and Allowance of 
Claims. 
(Formerly 345k 12) 
In order to meet requirements of statute, providing 
that "claim against a political subdivision shall be 
forever barred unless notice thereof is filed within 
ninety days after the cause of action arises," and to 
fulfill its intended purpose, the "filing" of a claim must 
include: that it be in writing; that it contain brief 
statement of facts and the nature of claim asserted; that 
it be subscribed by party required to give it and who 
intends to rely on it; that it be directed to and delivered 
to someone authorized to or responsible for receiving 
it; and that this be done within prescribed time. 
U.C.A. 1953,63-30-13. 
[3] Schools®^ 112 
345 — 
345II Public Schools 
34511(1) Claims Against District 
345kll2 Presentation and Allowance of 
Claims. 
(Formerly 345k 12) 
Where elementary school student was injured on 
playground while playing with dead wires dangling 
from utility poles, subsequent conversation between 
student's mother and principal in which principal 
allegedly stated that wires were left in such condition 
by utility company, coupled with a report of principal's 
investigation filed with school district office, did not 
constitute a "filing" within purview of statute requiring 
that a "claim against a political subdivision shall be 
forever barred unless notice thereof is filed within 
ninety7 days after the cause of action arises." 
U.C.A.1953,63-30-2, 63-30-3,63-30-13. 
[4] Estoppel @=*62.5 
156 — 
156III Equitable Estoppel 
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General 
156k62 Estoppel Against Public, 
Government, or Public 
Officers 
156k62.5 Acts of Officers or Boards. 
After elementary school student was injured on 
playground while playing with dead wires dangling 
from utility poles, alleged statement by school principal 
to student's mother that wires had been left in that 
condition by utility company did not estop school 
district from asserting statute governing time for filing 
claim against political subdivision as bar to cause of 
action after mother learned school employees were 
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responsible for the condition, where principal made no 
representation that school district was responsible and 
where he told mother that he could not give her any 
information or do anything about the situation and that 
the problem would have to be taken up with school 
district office. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-2, 63-30-3, 
63-30-13. 
*481 James F. Housley, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
Leonard H. Russon. of Hanson, Wadsworth & 
Russon, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent. 
CROCKETT, Justice: 
Plaintiff Francine G. Scarborough, for herself and 
as guardian for her 12-year-old son Jeffrey, sues to 
recover for injuries he suffered in a fall on the 
playground at the Holladay Elementary School of the 
defendant. Granite School District. Upon the basis of 
the pleadings, depositions and affidavits, the trial court 
ruled that because the plaintiff had failed to file a claim 
as required by Section 63-30-13, U.C.A.1953, 
quoted below, her action was barred; and therefore 
there was no issue of material fact which if resolved in 
her favor would entitle her to prevail, and entered 
judgment of dismissal against her. ([FN1]) She 
appeals. 
On the morning of February 29, 1972, Jeffrey, and 
other boys were playing on the ball ground of the 
School. About a month before, one of the utility poles 
had been knocked down by maintenance employees 
while trimming trees; and some dead wires had been 
left dangling from the remaining poles. It was in 
playing and swinging with these wires that Jeffrey fell 
several feet to the ground and suffered the injuries 
complained of. The principal, William Lee Anderson, 
was informed, examined and talked to the boy, and 
permitted him to go to class. About an hour later, 
Jeffrey developed nausea and began vomiting. His 
mother was called and she took him home. 
Later that day she called Mr. Anderson and talked 
to him about the apparently serious nature of Jeffrey's 
injuries, asked for details concerning the accident and 
responsibility therefor. She avers that he told her that 
the tree trimming had been done and the wires left in 
that condition by the utility company, Utah Power & 
Light Company. ([FN2]) Mr. Anderson filed a report 
of his investigation with the office of defendant, 
Granite School District. Two days after the accident, 
plaintiff employed an attorney (not present counsel) to 
handle this matter. It is alleged that in reliance on Mr. 
Anderson's statements, the attorney made demand upon 
the Utah Power & Light Company, and further, that it 
was not until six months later plaintiff learned that it 
was not Utah Power & Light Company, but employees 
of the School District who had done the work and left 
the wires in that condition. 
The statute of concern here upon which the court 
based its dismissal is Section 63-30-13, U.C.A.1953: 
A claim against a political subdivision shall be 
forever barred unless notice thereof is filed within 
ninety (90) days after the cause of action arises 
Plaintiff makes no contention that there was any 
literal compliance with that statute in the usual form or 
sense. Her argument is that because of the 
conversations with the principal, his representations as 
to who was responsible; and his report to the School 
District it should be deemed: (1) that she had made a 
sufficient 'filing' of a claim to satisfy the requirements 
of the statute; and (2) that the School District should be 
estopped to assert the protection of the statute. 
*482 Oral Statements as a 'Filing' 
[1][2][3] The School District is a political 
subdivision of the state. ([FN3]) Therefore it would 
normally be immune from suit; and the right to sue is 
an exception created by statute. ([FN4]) We have 
consistently held that where a cause of action is based 
upon a statute, full compliance with its requirements is 
a condition precedent to the right to maintain a suit. 
([FN5]) In order to so meet the requirements of the 
statute quoted above and fulfill its intended purpose, 
the 'filing' of a claim should include these essentials: 
that it be in wiriting; ([FN6]) that it contain a brief 
statement of the facts and the nature of the claim 
asserted, that it be subscribed by the party required to 
give it and who intends to rely on it; that it be directed 
to and delivered to someone authorized to or 
responsible for receiving it; and that this be done 
within the prescribed time. ([FN7]) It should require 
no exposition to demonstrate that the oral conversation 
with the school principal, and the fact that he turned in 
a report to the School District, do not satisfy the 
foregoing requirements. 
The Claimed Estoppel 
[4] On her issue relating to estoppel, the plaintiff 
argues that the conversation with the school principal 
brings her case within the ruling of this court in Rice v. 
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Granite School District. ([FN8]) There are significant 
differences between this case and that one. There the 
plaintiff had filed a timely written notice with the 
School District. The plaintiffs contention was that the 
insurance adjuster, who was handling the matter for the 
School District gave the plaintiff assurances that the 
case would be settled after the extent of injuries and 
damages had been determined, and that this lulled her 
into a sense of security until after the time for filing the 
suit had expired. Then the School District attempted to 
assert that as a defense. We remanded for a trial as to 
the facts. 
Here there is no averment that the principal, Mr. 
Anderson, made any representation, either that the 
School District was responsible, or that it would be 
responsible, to the plaintiff. The best that can be said 
from the plaintiffs point of view is that he told her 
either: that the Utah Power & Light Company was 
responsible, or that he was not sure who was 
responsible for the condition of the wires. But it is 
without dispute that he told her that he could not give 
her any information or do anything about it, and that 
that would have to be done with Dr. Lloyd of the 
School District office. Accordingly, he did nothing to 
delude, dissuade or delay plaintiff or her attorney in the 
filing of her claim. 
From what has been said herein it is our conclusion 
that the trial court could properly rule as a matter of 
law that because of the plaintiffs failure to file a claim 
within the time allowed by the statute; and because 
there is no basis upon which estoppel against the 
defendant's reliance on the statute could be made out, 
that she cannot show entitlement to maintain this 
action. 
Affirmed. No costs awarded. 
HENRIOD, C.J., and ELLETT and TUCKETT, 
JJ., concur. 
MAUGHAN, Justice (dissenting): 
I respectfully dissent. 
The facts as stated by Mr. Justice Crockett are 
accepted. 
*483 Our statute, 63-30-13, U.C.A.1953, as 
amended, says two things: 
A claim against a political subdivision shall be 
forever barred unless notice thereof is filed within 
ninety days after the cause of action arises; 
provided, however, that any claim filed against a 
city or incorporated town under section 63—30—8 
shall be governed by the provisions of section 
10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
First it says that a claim against a political 
subdivision will be barred, unless notice of the claim is 
filed within ninety days after the cause of action arises. 
Second, it says that any claim filed against a city or 
incorporated town under this section, shall not be 
governed by the provisions of 63-30-13, but shall be 
governed by the provisions of 10—7—77. The first part 
of the statute says nothing about a written notice, nor to 
whom notice shall be delivered. The second part of the 
statute requires examination of 10—7—77, which 
specifies that the claim referred to there must be in 
writing. It further is very explicit about what the notice 
of the claim must contain, and to whom it must be 
presented. These two statutes are distinctly different. 
They are similar only in the fact that both require some 
notice. 
The purpose of statutes requiring the presentation 
of claims to political subdivisions, prior to filing a suit, 
is in furtherance of public policy to prevent 
unnecessary litigation. The purpose of notice 
provisions is to afford the political subdivision an 
opportunity to investigate the claim while the matter is 
of recent memory, witnesses are yet available, 
conditions have not materially changed and to 
determine if there is liability, and if there is. the extent 
of it. These salutary provisions do serve to prevent 
needless litigation. ([FN1]) The procedure set out in 
the main opinion is merely more mechanistic, but 
would not impart any more notice than defendant had. 
The main opinion has engrafted on 63—30-13 all 
manner of requirements for the notice, which are not 
set forth in the statute, nor necessary. The subject 
statute says nothing about written notice, but the main 
opinion cites the case of Tooele Meat & Storage Co. v. 
Morse, 43 Utah 515, 136 P. 965, wherein. Mr. Justice 
Frick says: 
We think the law is well settled that where a statute 
requires notice to be given but is silent with respect 
to the manner of notification, written notice is 
understood. . . . A substantial compliance with the 
statute in that regard is, we think, all that is 
necessary. 
In support of that proposition, Mr. Justice Frick 
cites 29 Cvc. 1117: 
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The general rule in respect to notices is that mere 
informalities do not vitiate them so long as they do 
not mislead, and give the necessary information to 
the proper parties. 
In view of the fact that our statutes are to be 
liberally construed to effect their objectives and to 
promote justice, ([FN2]) I would not extend by 
implication, the terms of 63—30—13, particularly 
where it is invoked by a political subdivision to avoid 
liability. ([FN3])] 
*484. Given the salutary public policy in 
63—30—13, allowing one redress against a political 
subdivision, the lack of express requirements, and the 
substantial compliance doctrine set forth in the Tooele 
case, I would hold the following: 
That defendant did have notice, that it had written 
notice (in the form of the school principal's written 
report, filed with defendant), that it was not misled, and 
that it had all of the opportunities the statute means to 
provide it, viz., an opportunity to investigate, to secure 
its witnesses, to determine liability and the extent of it, 
all before a material change in conditions. If anyone 
were misled, plaintiff was. 
That if the foregoing were not determinative of this 
matter (and I think it is), the conflict in the statements 
of plaintiff and the school principal necessarily needs 
to be determined at trial, and if determined in plaintiffs 
favor, such would be sufficient to allow the action, 
because the detrimental effect of the misleading 
statement would thereby be cured. 
That the holding of the district court be reversed 
and the matter remanded for trial. 
(FN1.) SeeRule56,U.R.C.P. 
(FN2.) Mr. Anderson denied this, but in view of the 
rejection of her cause by dismissal, for the purpose 
of determining the correctness of the ruling, we 
accept her averment as the fact. 
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(FN3.) Sec. 63-30-2, U.C.A.1953, defines a 
political subdivision as:'. . . any county, city, town, 
school district.. / 
(FN4.) See Sec. 63-30-3, U.C.A.1953. 
(FN5.) Varoz v. Sevey. 29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 
435 (1973): Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 
27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972): Hurley v." Bingham, 63 
Utah 589, 228 P. 213 (1924). 
(FN6.) That an oral notice does not suffice as a 
'filing,' but it must be in writing, see Tooele Meat & 
Storage Co. v. Morse, 43 Utah 515, 136 P. 965; 
and see 66 C.J.S. Notice s 16, p. 656; and 58 
Am.Jur.2d, Notice, p. 505. 
(FN7.) 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, 
Counties and Other Political Subdivisions, Sec. 
683. 
(FN8.) 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159. 
(FN1.) 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, etc.. 
Sec. 686. 
(FN2.) Sec. 68-3-2 , U.C.A.1953. 
(FN3.) 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, etc., 
Sec. 687. 
FN4. See the dissents in Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 
Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972); Varoz v. 
Sevey, 29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435 (1973). 
FN5. The instant matter sparks recollection of the 
instructions given by the Khalif Omar, to his first 
Kadi c. 900 A.D.: 'If thou seest fit to judge 
differently from yesterday, do not hesitate to follow 
the truth as thou seest it; for truth is eternal and it is 
better to return to the true than to persist in the 
false!' 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Ron BELLONIO, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION and Salt 
Lake Airport Authority, 
Defendants and Appellant 
No. 950260-CA. 
Feb. 15, 1996. 
Pedestrian who tripped and fell in parking terrace at 
city airport brought personal injury action against city. 
City moved for dismissal for failure to comply with 
notice requirements of Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. The Third District Court Homer F. Wilkinson, J., 
refused to dismiss. City sought interlocutory appeal. 
The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that 
pedestrian failed to serve governing body of city, 
precluding action. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Orme, P.J.. concurred in result. 
West Headnotes 
[ 1 ] Appeal and Error <S=^842( 1) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or 
of Fact 
30k842(l) In General. 
Statutory interpretation is question of law which 
Court of Appeals reviews for correctness, granting no 
deference to trial court's determinations. 
[2] Statutes €=^188 
361 — 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361kl87 Meaning of Language 
361kl88 In General. 
[See headnote text below] 
[2] Statutes®^ 190 
361 — 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
36 Ik 187 Meaning of Language 
361 k 190 Existence of Ambiguity. 
When interpreting statute, Court of Appeals begins 
by examining its plain language, and will resort to 
other methods of statutory interpretation only if it finds 
language of statute to be ambiguous. 
[3] Municipal Corporations <@=^741.30 
268 — 
268X11 Torts 
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and 
Corporate Powers in 
General 
268k741 Notice or Presentation of Claims 
for Injury 
268k741.30 Service or Presentation; Time 
Therefor. 
Under plain meaning of Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act claim against political subdivision is 
barred unless notice is filed with "governing body" 
within one year of claim arising. U.C.A.1953, 
63-30-13. 
[4] Municipal Corporations <&z*141.30 
268 — 
268X11 Torts 
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and 
Corporate Powers in 
General 
268k741 Notice or Presentation of Claims 
for Injury 
268k741.30 Service or Presentation; Time 
Therefor. 
"Governing body" of city, within meaning of Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, is mayor and city 
council. U.C.A.1953, 10-1-104(2). 
[5] Municipal Corporations ®^857 
268 — 
268X11 Torts 
268XII(E) Condition or Use of Public 
Buildings and Other 
Property 
268k857 Actions for Injuries. 
Tort claim of pedestrian who tripped and fell in 
parking terrace of city airport was barred, where 
pedestrian failed to file notice of claim with either 
mayor or city council, even though airport's counsel 
told him to direct all correspondence to him personally, 
since pedestrian demonstrated understanding that 
service upon airport's counsel would not be sufficient 
under Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and airport's 
counsel was not agent of city. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-13. 
[6] Municipal Corporations ®^741.20 
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268 — 
268X11 Torts 
268XH(A) Exercise of Governmental and 
Corporate Powers in 
General 
268k741 Notice or Presentation of Claims 
for Injury 
268k741.20 Requirement as Mandatory or 
Condition Precedent. 
Since notice of claim was statutory' prerequisite to 
tort suit under Utah Governmental Immunity Act trial 
court was without jurisdiction to hear case of injured 
pedestrian who failed to serve notice on proper parties. 
U.C.A.1953,63-30-13. 
*1295 Roger H. Bullock (argued), Strong & 
Hanni, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Gordon K. Jensen (argued), Lehman. Jensen & 
Donahue, L.C., Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before ORME, P.J., DAVIS, Associate P.J., and 
GREENWOOD, J. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD. Judge: 
Appellant Salt Lake City Corporation (the City), on 
interlocutory appeal, seeks reversal of the trial court's 
refiisal to dismiss appellee Ron Bellonio's action, 
despite his failure to strictly comply with the relevant 
notice of claim requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11, -13 
(1993). We reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
Bellonio's cause of action arose on June 14, 1992, 
when he tripped and fell in the parking terrace at the 
Salt Lake International Airport (the Airport). Utilizing 
a "fill-in-the-blank" letter, dated July 9, 1992, 
Bellonio's first attorney informed the Airport's 
insurance carrier that he was representing Bellonio 
with respect to an accident which had occurred at the 
Airport. This letter was forwarded to Robert M. Kern, 
counsel for the Airport, who responded, on Jury 22, 
1992, instructing Bellonio to address future 
communications to his office. 
On December 7, 1992, Bellonio's second attorney 
sent a letter to the Airport's safety officer, requesting 
any reports regarding the accident. This letter was 
forwarded to Kern, who again requested, on December 
22, 1992, that all communications go through his 
office. 
Bellonio's attorney then sent a second letter to 
Kern, dated December 28, 1992, again requesting 
information and suggesting that settlement negotiations 
take place. In this letter Bellonio's counsel indicated 
his awareness of the potential bar of governmental 
immunity—even citing the relevant code sections—and 
of the procedures necessary to comply therewith. 
On January7 4, 1993, Kern responded that he did not 
possess much of the requested information and that the 
rest was likely privileged. On March 24, 1993, 
Bellonio's attorney sent a letter describing his theory of 
the Airport's liability. He also provided a synopsis of 
Bellonio's medical expenses to date and threatened to 
file a "Notice of Intent to Commence Legal Action" if 
no settlement took place. Kern acknowledged receipt 
of this letter on April 6, 1993, and indicated he was 
awaiting reports by Bellonio's experts indicating any 
possible liability on the part of the Airport. 
On June 11, 1993. Bellonio's attorney prepared a 
document titled "NOTICE OF INTENT TO 
COMMENCE LEGAL ACTION AGAINST THE 
STATE OF UTAH OR ONE OF ITS POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISIONS." This document was served by 
mail upon the Utah Attorney General, the Salt Lake 
City Attorney, the Airport Director, *1296 and Kern, 
but not upon the City's Mayor or the Salt Lake City 
Council. 
Finally, Bellonio's third set of attorneys filed a 
complaint against the City and the Airport on June 14, 
1994. The trial court dismissed the claims against the 
Airport, having determined it was a division of Salt 
Lake City Coq>oration, rather than a governmental 
entity in its own right. This dismissal has not been 
appealed. The City also sought dismissal due to 
Bellonio's failure to comply with the notice of claim 
procedures of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
The trial court denied this motion and the City brought 
this interlocutory appeal. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
The sole issue before this court is whether Bellonio 
properly complied with those notice of claim 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
which apply when an individual sues a political 
subdivision. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11, -13 
(1993). Belionio argues that constructive notice to the 
governmental entity, coupled with substantial 
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compliance with respect to the form of the notice, is 
sufficient. The City disagrees, contending that only 
actual notice and strict compliance with all aspects of 
the notice of claim requirements will satisfy the 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] Statutory interpretation is a question of law 
which we review for correctness, granting no deference 
to the trial court's determinations. Bhttain v. State, 
882 P.2d 666,668 (Utah App. 1994). 
ANALYSIS 
This court has addressed the requirements for filing 
a proper notice of claim in two recent cases. See 
generally Bischel v. Memtt, 907 P.2d 275 (Utah 
App. 1995) and Bhttain, 882 P.2d at 666. From both 
the language of the Governmental Immunity Act and 
extant case law, some initial guiding principles are 
clear. First the Governmental Immunity Act requires 
that "[a]ny person having a claim for injury against a 
governmental entity ... shall file a written notice of 
claim with the entity before maintaining an action." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2) (1993) (emphasis 
added). Second, this notice of claim must be filed with 
the correct persons or entities. See id. §§ 63-30-12, 
-13 (1993); see also Yates v. Vernal Family Health 
Ctr., 617 R2d 352, 354 (Utah 1980); Lamarrv. Utah 
State Department ofTransp., 828 P.2d 535. 540-41 
(Utah App. 1992). 
In the case of a political subdivision such as the 
City, "[a] claim ... isbarred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the governing body of the political 
subdivision within one year after the claim arises." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993) (emphasis added); 
Yates, 617 P.2d at 354. Bellonio argues the notices he 
filed with the attorney general, the Salt Lake City 
Attorney, the Airport Director and Kern satisfied the 
statutory requirements. (FN1) We disagree. 
[2] [3] When interpreting a statute, we begin by 
examining its plain language. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 
843, 845 (Utah 1992); Bhttain, 882 P.2d at 670. "We 
will resort to other methods of statutory interpretation 
only if we find the language of the statutes to be 
ambiguous." Vigil, 842 P.2d at 845. In this particular 
case, we need look no further than the statute's 
language. The plain meaning of section 13 is that a 
claim against a political subdivision is "barred" unless 
notice is filed with the "governing body" within one 
year of the claim arising. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 
(1993). The only remaining question concerns the 
term "governing body." 
[4] [5] Under existing statutory and case law there 
is no ambiguity to the term "governing body." The 
"governing body" of Salt Lake City is the mayor and 
the city council. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104(2) 
(1992) (FN2); accord Yates, 617 P.2d at 354 (finding 
that *1297 "governing body" was the county 
commission and that failure to file notice with the 
commission was fatal to plaintiffs claim). Because 
Bellonio never filed his notice of claim with either the 
mayor or the city* council, his claim is barred. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993). 
Bellonio argues that "governing body" contains a 
latent ambiguity and that, even if we find that it does 
not it should be interpreted in an equitable fashion 
since service upon the Salt Lake City Attorney 
substantially fulfills the purposes behind the notice of 
claim requirement. We disagree. As noted in previous 
opinions of this court and the supreme court: 
" 'The primary purpose of a notice of claim 
requirement is to afford the responsible public 
authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and 
timely investigation of the merits of a claim and to 
arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby 
avoiding the expenditure of public revenue for 
costly and unnecessary litigation.'" 
Bischel, 907 P.2d at 278 (quoting Bhttain, 882 
P.2d at 671 (quoting Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 618 
P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1980))). While this statement, 
and others like it. may seem to indicate a flexible rule 
of constructive notice to governmental entities, this is 
not the general rule in this state. 
Utah courts have typically required strict 
compliance with the notice of claim requirements 
except in certain very limited circumstances. See, e.g., 
Scarborough v. Granite School Dist., 531 P.2d 480, 
482 (Utah 1975) (construing former statute and noting 
that "where a cause of action is based upon a statute, 
full compliance with its requirements is a condition 
precedent to the right to maintain a suit."); see also 
Bhttain, 882 P.2d at 669. 
Nevertheless, in two recent opinions from this 
court, plaintiffs have been allowed to proceed despite 
certain inadequacies in their notice of claim filings. 
See Bischel, 907 P.2d at 279; Bhttain, 882 P.2d at 
672-73. However, the precedential effect of those 
cases is limited by their unique factual underpinnings 
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and therefore, neither should be construed as an 
indication that we are prepared to abrogate the long-
standing rule requiring strict compliance with all 
aspects of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
In Brittain, we determined that service of a notice 
of claim upon the attorney general and upon the State 
Division of Risk Management satisfied Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993), which requires service upon 
the attorney general and upon the "agency concerned." 
882 P.2d at 672. Brittain, however, is distinguishable 
from the present appeal in that it involved section 12 
rather than section 13 of the Governmental Immunity 
Act. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993) 
with Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993). Therefore, 
while this court found it reasonable to construe Risk 
Management as the "agency concerned" in section 12, 
it does not follow, a fortiori, that the Salt Lake City 
Attorney is the "governing body" of Salt Lake City in 
section 13. In fact, in contradistinction to section 12, 
section 13 contains no indication that the City's legal 
counsel is entitled to any notice of claim. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993). 
Section 13, unlike section 12. contemplates that a 
notice of claim is to be directed only to a political 
subdivision's governing body, not to its legal counsel. 
This interpretation is consistent with the Utah Supreme 
Court's earlier pronouncements that a primary purpose 
of the notice of claim is to "afford the responsible 
public authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper 
and timely investigation of the merits of a claim." 
Stahl, 618 P.2d at 482 (construing section 12) 
(emphasis added). 
Given our determination that section 13 requires 
service upon the mayor and the city council, this court's 
recent opinion in Bischel requires some elucidation. In 
Bischel, this court allowed a claim against Salt Lake 
County to proceed despite the fact that the notice of 
claim was, in fact, served upon the Salt Lake County 
Attorney, rather than upon the Salt Lake County 
Commission as dictated by section 13. Bischel 907 
P.2d at 278. While Bischel may, at first blush, appear 
to be controlling in this case, that opinion was based 
upon a unique set of facts which is absent in this 
appeal. 
In Bischel the plaintiff was unsure of how to serve 
the county commission with a notice of claim; 
therefore, she did an entirely sensible thing and called 
the commission to ask for instructions. Id She was 
instructed, by *1298. an agent of the commission, to 
serve her notice of claim upon the Salt Lake County 
Attorney. Id On those facts, this court found that the 
plaintiff had complied with the statute, as 
misinterpreted for her by the county commission. Id. 
at 279. Thus, the end result in Bischel was not based 
upon a substantial compliance or constructive notice 
theory, but rather was founded upon the apparent 
agency of the commission employee. Id. at 278-79. 
The inequity of allowing the commission to base its 
defense upon its agent's misinformation prompted this 
court to utilize an estoppel-type argument to prevent 
the commission from forging the shield of 
governmental immunity into a sword. Id. at 279; see 
also id. at 280 (Bench, J., dissenting) (stating that 
majority's theory is implicitly one of estoppel). 
Bellonio attempts to place himself within a similar 
factual scenario, arguing that the Airport's counsel told 
him to direct all correspondence to him personally. 
While it is clear that Kern did make such a request he 
never indicated either expressly or impliedly, that he 
was the proper agent to receive the statutorily 
mandated notice of claim, nor did Bellonio request 
from him any information regarding Governmental 
Immunity Act compliance. See Scarborough, 531 
P.2d at 482 (finding no basis, under former law, for 
estoppel when principal of school admitted no liability 
and did nothing to hinder plaintiffs filing of notice of 
claim). 
Furthermore, Bellonio's December 28, 1992 letter 
to Kern demonstrated Bellonio's apparent familiarity 
with the procedural requirements of the Governmental 
Immunity Act. Also, the fact that Bellonio served 
notices upon the attorney general and the airport 
director, in addition to the Salt Lake City Attorney and 
Kern, indicates an understanding that service upon 
Kern alone would not be sufficient. (FN3) 
Finally, unlike the facts in Bischel, Kern was never 
the agent, apparently or in fact, of the mayor or the city 
council. While the Salt Lake Airport Authority is not a 
political subdivision, but rather a division of Salt Lake 
City Corporation, it is certainly not the governing body 
of Salt Lake City nor the agent of the mayor or the city 
council. Therefore, unlike the plaintiff in Bischel, 
Bellonio never even attempted to direct his notice of 
claim to the proper party, i.e., the mayor or the city 
council. 
[6] Accordingly, we conclude that Bellonio did not 
properly file his notice of claim and, therefore, his 
claim is barred by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993). 
Since a notice of claim is a statutory prerequisite to 
suit the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear 
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Bellonio's case and erred by allowing him to proceed. 
Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 540. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Bellonio did not file the required notice of 
claim with the Salt Lake City Mayor or the Salt Lake 
City Council within one year, as required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993), his claim is barred. 
Therefore, the trial court was without jurisdiction to 
allow his claim to proceed. Accordingly, we reverse 
the decision of the trial court and remand for an entry 
of judgment dismissing Bellonio's action with 
prejudice. 
DAVIS, Associate P.J., concurs. 
ORME, P.J., concurs in result. 
(FN1.) The City argues the notices of claim were also 
deficient in other regards and did not meet the 
formal requirements of section 63-30-11(3). 
However, due to our disposition of this case on the 
issue of improper service, we do not reach this 
issue. 
(FN2.) Section 10-1-104(2) states: " 'Governing 
body' means collectively the legislative body and 
the executive of anv municipality." Utah Code 
Ann. §10-1-104(2)(1992). 
(FN3.) We note that this shotgun approach to service-
peppering the valley with notices of claim and 
hoping one will hit close to the mark—is an 
unsatisfactory way of assuring compliance with the 
statute. While such a strategy may often result in 
giving notice in fact, as the present case illustrates, 
it does not guarantee compliance with the 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
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OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Caren Bischel appeals the trial court's denial of her 
motion to set aside an order dismissing her personal 
injury7 action. Salt Lake County prevailed below on its 
motion to dismiss Bischel's action for failure to file a 
notice of claim in accordance with the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. We reverse and remand. 
FACTS 
On February 1, 1993, Heather J. Merritt, a Salt 
Lake County employee, caused an automobile accident 
in which Bischel was allegedly injured. On April 22. 
1993, Bischel prepared a notice of claim pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1993) and called the Salt 
Lake County Commission to determine how and with 
whom the notice of claim should be filed. Bischel was 
told to send the notice to Trish McDonald at the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office. Bischel then called 
McDonald who confirmed the instructions and 
provided the proper address for the notice. Bischel 
sent the notice by certified mail and received a return 
receipt signed by McDonald. 
McDonald and other county employees 
subsequently negotiated the claim with Bischel. In 
May 1993, the county issued a $680 check for property 
damage to Bischel's vehicle. By January 1994, 
however, Bischel's personal injury claim had not been 
settled, and she filed the present action. Salt Lake 
County then moved to dismiss Bischel's lawsuit for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting the claim 
was not preserved as required by the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-13 (1993). The County based its motion to 
dismiss on the single fact that Bischel's notice of claim 
was addressed to McDonald rather than to the County 
Commission. 
[1] The trial court granted the County's motion. 
The County, however, failed to give Bischel timely 
notice of the entry of judgment. See Utah 
R.Jud.Admin. 4-504(4) (1995). Once she received the 
trial court's *277 order of dismissal, Bischel filed a 
motion to set aside that order. (FN1) Bischel now 
challenges the trial court's denial of her rule 60(b) 
motion. 
NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT 
[2][3] Bischel argues the trial court abused its 
discretion wheu it failed to recognize a mistake and set 
aside its order. The County responds the trial court 
made no mistake of law and therefore did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to set aside its original order of 
dismissal. Rule 60(b)(1) provides a trial court may 
relieve a party' of a judgment in case of mistake. (FN2) 
A judicial error or "mistake of law by the trial court 
may support a Rule 60(b) motion." Udy v. Udy, 893 
P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah App. 1995). Trial courts have 
discretion to determine whether a mistake of law 
existed, and we will reverse only if there has been an 
abuse of that discretion. Id. Under the facts of the 
present case, we conclude a mistake of law existed; 
therefore, the trial court abused its discretion when it 
denied Bischel's rule 60(b) motion. 
[4] The Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
provides that 
[a]ny person having a claim for injury against a 
governmental entity, or against an employee for an 
act or omission occurring during the performance 
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority shall file written notice of 
claim with the entity before maintaining an action, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise 
to the claim ILS characterized as governmental. 
... The notice of claim shall be ... directed and 
delivered to the responsible governmental entity 
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 
or 63-30-13. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1993) (emphasis 
added). The requirements of section 63-30-13 simply 
provide that 
[a] claim against a political subdivision, or against 
its employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within the 
scope of employment, or under color of authority, is 
barred unless notice of claim is filed with the 
governing body of the political subdivision within 
one year after the claim arises. 
Id. § 63-30-13 (emphasis added). Under these 
sections, plaintiffs must give timely notice to the 
governing body of a county to maintain an action 
against that county. 
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It is undisputed that Bischel sent a certified notice 
of claim to the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office and 
that the County Attorney's Office accepted that notice. 
The trial court concluded Bischel's formal complaint 
was barred because Bischel failed to file a proper 
notice of claim in compbance with the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. To determine the 
accuracy of the trial court's legal conclusion, we must 
determine what filing a notice of claim with the 
governing body practically requires of citizens with 
claims against political subdivisions of the state. See 
Brittain v. State ex rel Utah Dep't of Employment 
*278 Sea, 882 P.2d 666, 669-70 (Utah App 1994). 
(FN3) 
The statute does not prescribe a specific manner or 
method for filing notice with the governing body of the 
political subdivision. Whereas requirements for the 
form and content of the notice of claim are specifically 
articulated in the statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-11(3) (1993), requirements for direction and 
delivery of the notice must be inferred from the phrase, 
"notice of claim is filed with the governing body of the 
political subdivision within one year after the claim 
arises." Id. §63-30-13. In other words, although the 
time requirement is clearly expressed, the statute is 
generally silent about how notice should be filed with 
the governing body. Furthermore, the County has not 
articulated any policy or specific procedure for citizens 
to file notice of civil claims. 
Because the statute does not prescribe specific 
procedures for direction and delivery of the notice of 
claim, we will interpret section 63-30-13 "in a manner 
consistent with the overall purpose of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act." (FN4) Brittain, 882 
P.2d at 670, "It is necessary to consider the policy of 
the notice requirement so that in any particular case the 
facts can be evaluated to determine if the intent of the 
statute has been accomplished...." Stahl v. Utah 
Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480,482 (Utah 1980). 
"[T]he primary purpose of a notice of claim 
requirement is to afford the responsible public 
authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and 
timely investigation of the merits of a claim and to 
arrive at a timely settlement if appropriate, thereby 
avoiding the expenditure of public revenue for 
costly and unnecessary litigation." 
Brittain, 882 P.2d at 671 (quoting Stahl, 618 P.2d 
at 482). Filing notice "tends to minimize the 
difficulties that may arise due to changes in 
administrations" and "protects against the passage of 
time obscuring memory and distorting a plaintiffs 
recollection of the events which are at the heart of the 
claim." Id. at 671. 
In the present case, Bischel, not finding explicit 
instructions in the statute but wanting to ensure her 
notice was directed and delivered correctly, called the 
County Commission and was instructed to send the 
notice to Trish McDonald in the County Attorney's 
office. Bischel took the further step of confirming the 
County Commission's instruction with McDonald. 
McDonald agreed she was the proper person to receive 
the notice and even provided the address where the 
notice should be filed. Thus, McDonald verified her 
apparent authority to receive the notice on behalf of the 
County Commission. 
McDonald's instruction to Bischel was certainly 
reasonable given that the County Attorney's staff 
investigates and negotiates civil claims against the 
County. Bischel had no reason to question such a 
sensible instruction. Bischel's notice enabled the 
County to investigate the claim and to move toward 
settlement. Bischel's notice also memorialized the 
events at the heart of her claim. Bischel thus fulfilled 
the purpose of the notice requirement by filing notice 
of her claim with the designated person in the County 
Attorney's Office. 
Considering the duties and authority delegated to 
the County Attorney's Office, it is evident that the 
governmental entity entrusted with investigating and 
settling or defending the claim received the requisite 
notice well within the one-year period imposed by the 
statute. Directing and delivering her notice of claim to 
the County Attorney's Office in no way inhibited 
settling Bischel's claim without resort to litigation. In 
fact, given the powers and responsibilities the County 
has bestowed upon the County Attorney's *279 
Office, the opposite is true. See id. at 672. Filing 
notice with the County Attorney's Office facilitated 
settlement discussions. Indeed, the County Attorney's 
Office actively pursued settlement of Bischel's claim, 
even paying her property damage. 
[5] Utah courts have established a rule of strict 
compbance with the notice provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. See, e.g., Yates v. 
Vernal Family Health Ctr., 617 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 
1980); Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't ofTransp., 828 
P.2d 535, 541 (Utah App. 1992). Our holding today is 
consistent with that rule. The present case is not one in 
which a plaintiff gave no notice, see, e.g., Madsen v. 
Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 628 (Utah 1983), or in which 
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a plaintiff filed only one of the two required notices, 
see, e.g., Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 540-41. This case is 
also not one in which the notice of claim was defective 
in form or content, see, e.g., Cox v. Utah Mortgage & 
Loan Corp., 716 P.2d 783, 786 (Utah 1986), or in 
which notice of claim was not filed within the one-year 
period see, e.g., Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276, 
277 (Utah 1985) (per curiam). As required by the 
statute, Bischel gave the County notice of claim; 
Bischel's notice complied with the statute's form and 
content requirements; and Bischel's notice was timely 
filed. Bischel therefore strictly complied with the 
statute and with the County Commission's instructions. 
In sum, because Bischel directed and delivered her 
notice precisely as instructed by the statute and the 
County Commission, her notice was adequate. Further, 
because her notice and the ensuing lawsuit were timely 
filed, the trial court's refusal to set aside its dismissal 
must be reversed. Bischel must be given the 
opportunity to pursue her claim. (FN5) It appears at 
best disingenuous for the County to argue that Bischel's 
notice was inadequate merely because she directed and 
delivered it as the County Commission and County 
Attorney's Office instructed. The public deserves more 
consistent, more credible treatment from its servants. 
CONCLUSION 
We hold that Bischel's notice of claim met the 
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
We therefore conclude the trial court abused its 
discretion when it failed to find a mistake of law under 
rule 60(b)(1) and denied Bischel's motion to set aside 
its earlier judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial 
court's order and remand the matter for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
ORME, P.J., concurs. 
BENCH. Judge (dissenting): 
Had Bischel filed a timely appeal from the 
judgment of dismissal, we would have to reach the 
issue of whether she filed a timely notice of claim with 
"the governing body" as required by Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-13 (1993). However, Bischel didnol appeal the 
judgment of dismissal. She appeals only the denial of 
her post-judgment motion. See main opinion at notes 1 
and 2. 
"The trial court is afforded broad discretion in 
ruling on a motion for relief from judgment under Utah 
RXiv.P. 60(b), and its determination will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Birch v. 
Birch, 111 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App.1989). Insofar 
as Bischel's post-judgment motion can be construed to 
be a 60(b) motion, the trial court acted within its 
discretion in denying the motion. To hold otherwise is 
to effectively allow a 60(b) motion to stay the time for 
appealing the underlying judgment. Utah courts have 
consistently held that a 60(b) motion does not stay the 
time for appealing a judgment. Lord v. lx>rd, 709 P.2d 
338, n. 1 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) (stating that "[r]ule 
60(b) motions do not toll the time for appeal"); Peay 
v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841, 842 (Utah 1980) (explaining 
that rule 60(b) motion does not extend time for filing 
notice of appeal); Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 
120, 122 n. 2, 466 P.2d 843, 845 n. 2 (1970) (same); 
Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 280, 282 P.2d 
845,847 (1955) (same); see also Utah R.App.P. 4(b). 
*280 In her post-judgment motion. Bischel 
reargued and restated the same arguments she had 
made in opposing the motion to dismiss. No new 
information was provided, nor were any new 
arguments made. The trial court held that Bischel 
"failed to articulate sufficient reasons justifying relief," 
and denied the post-judgment motion. That ruling is 
within the broad discretion of the trial court. 
Even if we could get beyond the procedural defect 
discussed above, the main opinion fails to follow 
controlling precedent in discussing the merits of the 
case. The main opinion erroneously relies upon 
Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1994) to 
divine the meaning of the "governing body" provision 
of section 63-30-13. Brittain, however, involved a 
different statute. 
In Brittain, Ihe plaintiff had been injured at a Job 
Service building in Provo, Utah. This court was 
interpreting section 63-30-12, which requires notice to 
be filed with the Attorney General's office and the 
"agency concerned" in any action against the state. The 
plaintiff properly served notice upon the Attorney 
General's office but instead of also serving notice upon 
Job Service or the Division of Facilities Construction 
and Management, the plaintiff sent notice to the 
Division of Risk Management. At trial, the State 
succeeded on its motion to dismiss for failure to file 
notice with the 'agency concerned," and the plaintiff 
appealed. To interpret "agency concerned," this court 
relied on the dictionary definition of "concerned" as 
including those who are "interested." The court 
concluded that "interested" included the Division of 
Risk Management since it ultimately handled such 
claims. Id. at 671. 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
907 P.2d 275. Bischel v. Merritt (Utah App. 1995) Page 5 
However, this type of interpretation is 
inappropriate in construing the "governing body" 
provision of section 63-30-13. In construing that 
section, the Utah Supreme Court has previously 
indicated that the governing body of a county is the 
county commission. Yates v. Vernal Family Health 
Ctr., 617 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1980). In Yates, the 
supreme court expressly held that a complaint against a 
county was properly dismissed because plaintiff did not 
give timely notice to the county commission. Id. 
Bischel did not serve any notice on the Salt Lake 
County Commission. Bischel also failed to establish, 
by competent evidence, that she had followed the 
county commission's instructions as to how to file a 
notice of claim. She presented no sworn statement 
from a member of the county commission or any 
employee of the commission. She did not even secure 
a sworn statement from Trish McDonald. (FN1) 
Merely claiming that some unidentified person told her 
where and how to file her claim is not enough to 
withstand the strict filing requirements of the 
Governmental Immunity7 Act. See Lamarr v. Utah 
State Dep't of Transp., %2% P.2d 535, 540-41 (Utah 
App.1992). Bischel has failed to meet her burden of 
showing that the county commission, in some way, 
waived those strict notice requirements. 
Implicit in the main opinion's decision is that 
because of what an unidentified commission employee 
allegedly told Bischel's attorney, the county 
commission should now be estopped from holding 
Bischel to the strict requirements of the Governmental 
Immunity Act. It is, however, very difficult to estop 
the government. See Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 
646 P.2d 715, 720 (Utah 1982). Only "well-
substantiated representations" by a governmental entity 
will suffice. Anderson v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 839 
P.2d 822, 828 (Utah 1992). To estop a governmental 
entity, its representations must generally take the form 
of a written statement by an authorized person. Id. at 
827; Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689, 694-95 (Utah 1979); 
Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 795 P.2d 671, 
675-76 (Utah App. 1990). 
There is clearly no written statement in this case. 
Bischel has not even identified the commission 
employee who allegedly told her to file her notice with 
the county attorney. Under those circumstances, the 
county commission cannot be estopped from holding 
Bischel *281. to the strict notice provisions of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
For the foregoing reasons. I would affirm. 
(FN1.) We note that Bischel labeled her motion to set 
aside the trial court's order of dismissal as being 
made pursuant to rules 59 and 60 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. However, Bischel filed the 
motion more than ten days after entry of judgment 
because she did not receive timely notice of the 
judgment from the County'. The trial court thus 
properly considered the motion under rule 60 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than under 
rule 59. See Utah R.Ch.P. 59; Fackrell v. 
Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1987) (Rule 
59 motions must be made within ten days after 
entry of judgment). 
(FN2.) Although Bischel labeled her motion as a rule 
60(b)(7) motion, it is the substance of the motion, 
not the caption that is controlling. State v. Parker, 
872 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994); Kunzler v. O'Dell, 
855 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1993). Thus, the 
trial court should have treated the motion as a rule 
60(b)(1) motion rather than a rule 60(b)(7) motion 
because the substance of the motion challenged the 
trial court's definition of "strict compliance" 
required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Furthermore, the trial court should have treated the 
motion as falling under rule 60(b)(1) because that 
subsection benefited Bischel. See Parker, 872 P.2d 
at 1044 n. 3 (noting court should choose rule 60 
subsection that most benefits party seeking relief). 
Additionally, Bischel filed her motion within the 
three-month time frame required by rule 60(b)( 1). 
(FN3.) In dissent. Judge Bench asserts our reliance on 
Bhttain is erroneous because Brittam interpreted a 
different statute. Indeed, Bhttain focused on 
section 63-30-12 rather than on section 63-30-13. 
However, the two sections are identical in then-
requirements for directing and delivering notice of 
claim. The basic difference between the two 
sections is that section 63-30-12 addresses claims 
against the state while section 63-30-13 addresses 
claims against political subdivisions of the state. 
(FN4.) For brief discussions of how the doctrine of 
governmental immunity evolved, see Condemarin 
v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 349-51 (Utah 
1989), and Bhttain, 882 P.2d at 668-69. 
(FN5.) We have also reviewed Bischel's claim for 
costs and attorney fees incurred on appeal. We 
deny the claim, finding it without merit. See State 
v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989) 
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(observing court may decline to address arguments 
without merit on appeal). 
(FNl.) Bischel's attorney merely alleged that an 
unidentified receptionist told him to file a notice 
with McDonald in the county attorney's office. In 
an affidavit the Chief Deputy of the Government 
Services Division of the county attorney's office 
stated that Trish McDonald was not authorized to 
accept notices of claim on behalf of the county 
commission. 
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Harold BRITTAIN, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
STATE of Utah, by and through UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY aka Job Service; and the State of 
Utah, by and 
through Utah Division of Facilities, Construction 
and 
Management, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 930416-CA. 
Sept. 15.1994. 
Claimant brought tort suit against state. The 
District Court Utah County. Lynn W. Davis. J., 
dismissed complaint and appeal was taken. The Court 
of Appeals, Orme, Associate P.J., held that claimant 
had satisfied requirement that notice be given to "the 
concerned agency," by filing notice and proper form 
with Department of Risk Management even though 
claimant had not filed notice with Job Service or 
Division of Facilities Construction and Management 
agencies claimed to be at fault. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and Error ®=:::>863 
30 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent in 
General 
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on 
Nature of Decision 
Appealed from 
30k863 In General. 
Court of Appeals will uphold trial court's grant of 
motion to dismiss only when it clearly appears plaintiff 
or plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under facts 
alleged or under any state of facts they could prove to 
support their claim. 
[2] Appeal and Error <@=*919 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(G) Presumptions 
30k915 Pleading 
30k919 Striking Out or Dismissal. 
On appeal from motion from grant of motion to 
dismiss, appellate court accepts facts alleged and 
complaint as true, and considers those facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in light most 
favorable to plaintiff. 
[3] Appeal and Error <@=*842(1) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or 
of Fact 
30k842(l) In General. 
Trial court's interpretation of statute is legal 
conclusion reviewed for correctness, according no 
particular deference to trial court. 
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360 — 
360 VI Actions 
360k 194 Conditions Precedent to Action 
Against State 
360k 197 Presentation of Claim. 
Strict compliance with notice requirement has 
typically been necessary7 to maintain tort action against 
state under Governmental Immunity- Act. U.C.A.1953, 
63-30-1 to 63-30-38. 
[5] States®^ 197 
360 — 
360 VI Actions 
360k 194 Conditions Precedent to Action 
Against State 
360kl97 Presentation of Claim. 
State Division of Risk Management could be "the 
agency concerned" for purposes of Governmental 
Immunity Act requirement that notice of claim be filed 
upon "the agency concerned," even though Immunity 
Act went into effect in 1966 and Department was not 
created until 1981; powers and responsibilities 
conferred on Department were sufficient to qualify it as 
a concerned agency. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-11,63-30-12 
,63A-4-101to63A-4-206. 
[6] Statutes <©^214 
361 — 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k213 Extrinsic Aids to Construction 
361k214 In General. 
In interpreting statute, court first examines its plain 
language and will resort to other methods of statutory 
interpretation only if court determines that language is 
ambiguous. 
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State 
360k 197 Presentation of Claim. 
Term "agency concerned" employed in 
Governmental Immunity Act requirement that "agency 
concerned" be given notice of tort claim, was not clear 
on its face, requiring appellate court to interpret 
requirement in manner consistent with overall purpose 
of Act; there could be more than one agency 
responsible for injury, and term was not necessarily 
limited to those having fault responsibility. 
U.C.A.1953,63-30-12. 
[8] States <©=> 197 
360 — 
360 VI Actions 
360k 194 Conditions Precedent to Action 
Against State 
360k 197 Presentation of Claim. 
Primary purpose of notice of claim requirement, in 
connection with suits against state, is to afford 
responsible public authorities opportunity to pursue 
proper and timely investigation of merits of claim and 
to arrive at timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby 
avoiding expenditure of public revenue for costly and 
unnecessary7 litigation. U.C.A.1953.63-30-12. 
[9] States®^ 197 
360 — 
360 VI Actions 
360k 194 Conditions Precedent to Action 
Against State 
360k 197 Presentation of Claim. 
"The agency concerned." as used in statute 
requiring that notice of tort claims against state be filed 
with "the agency concerned," refers to an any agency 
with legitimate interests in claim and legal proceedings 
which might result therefrom. U.C.A.1953,63-30-12. 
[10] States @=* 197 
360 — 
360 VI Actions 
360k 194 Conditions Precedent to Action 
Against State 
360kl97 Presentation of Claim. 
Tort claimant had satisfied requirement, of 
Governmental Immunity Act, that notice of claim be 
filed with "the agency concerned," by filing notice with 
the Department of Risk Management, even though 
other agencies were alleged to have caused injuries; 
Department was empowered to handle claims on 
behalf of state, and was to receive notice of claims 
served on other agencies. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-12, 
63A-4-101 to 63A-4-206; Utah Admin.Code 
R37-1-1. 
[11] States <§==>197 
360 — 
360 VI Actions 
360k 194 Conditions Precedent to Action 
Against State 
360k 197 Presentation of Claim. 
Receipt of actual notice of claim does not satisfy 
requirement that tort claimant notify- "the agency 
concerned" as required by the Governmental Immunity 
Act. U.C.A.1953.63-30-12. 
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Before DAVIS, JACKSON and ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Harold Brittain appeals the trial court's order 
dismissing his ipersonal injury claim for failure to file 
notice in accordance with the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. We reverse and remand. 
FACTS 
On February 4, 1991, Brittain was injured when he 
fell down some icy steps at the Department of 
Employment Security (Job Service) in Provo, Utah. 
Shortly after the. accident James Christiansen, a claims 
adjuster and investigator, contacted Brittain and 
indicated he would be handling the claim on behalf of 
Job Service and the Utah Division of Risk 
Management. 'On March 11, 1991, Brittain, through 
his attorney, filed notice of his claim with both the 
attorney general and the Division of Risk Management. 
Brittain alleged that melting snow had dripped off the 
roof of the building and frozen on the steps, that the 
Division of Facilities Construction and Management 
(DFCM) was negligent in approving the design and 
construction of the building, and that both DFCM and 
Job Service were negligent in maintaining the building 
and its premises. Christiansen met with Brittain's 
attorney on March 12, 1991, to discuss settling 
Brittain's claim. From mid-April through the end of 
August of 1991, those discussions continued. During 
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that time, Christiansen sent Brittain's attorney six 
separate letters reaffirming that he was acting as an 
agent on behalf of Job Service and Risk Management. 
The settlement discussions failed and Brittain, having 
sent timely notice of his claim to both the Utah 
Attorney General and Risk Management, filed this 
action. 
On June 4, 1992, after fifteen months of settlement 
discussion and extensive discovery, and only four days 
before the case was to be tried, the State filed a motion 
to dismiss on the ground that Brittain had failed to file 
notice of claim with either Job Service or DFCM as 
required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -38 (1993 & 
Supp.1994). The trial court, ruling from the bench, 
granted the State's motion, reasoning that filing notice 
of claim with Risk Management did not fulfill the 
necessary requirement of filing notice with "the agency 
concerned." Id. § 63-30-12. Brittain appeals from this 
order. 
ISSUE 
The sole issue presented is whether, given the facts 
of this case, the trial court erred by concluding that 
Brittain's serving notice of claim upon Risk 
Management did not constitute service upon the agency 
concerned as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 
(1993). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1][2][3] We will uphold a trial court's grant of a 
motion to dismiss "only where it clearly appears that 
the plaintiff or plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief 
under the facts alleged or under any state of facts they 
could prove to support their claim." Prows v. State, 
822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991). On appeal, we accept 
the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and consider 
those facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, in a light most favorable to plaintiff. 
Demondv. FHP, 849 P.2d 598, 599 (Utah App. 1993). 
Key to our decision is the interpretation of the statute 
imposing a notice requirement as a prerequisite to 
bringing an action against the State. The trial court's 
interpretation of a statute is a legal conclusion which 
we review for correctness, according no particular 
deference to the trial court. Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 
822 P.2d 770,771 (Utah 1991). 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
The doctrine of sovereign or governmental 
immunity—requiring the consent of the State in order to 
subject it to suit in its own courts—is a deeph rooted 
and well recognized *669 doctrine of American 
common law. See Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 
629 (Utah 1983). The doctrine is a cam over from 
medieval times, and reflects the notion that the 
sovereign, in whom reposed ultimate governmental 
powers, was simply incapable of doing wrong. (FN 1) 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, see Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -38 (1993 & Supp.1994), which 
went into effect in 1966, codified the common law 
principle of sovereign immunity and created various 
exceptions to the doctrine. Madsen, 658 P.2d at 
629-30. 
[4] Scores of Utah cases have interpreted this Act 
and defined the requirements necessary to overcome 
the State's immunity. (FN2) Among these many 
cases, courts have, periodically, had occasion to 
interpret the Act's notice requirements. See, e.g., Cox 
v. Utah Mortgage & Loan Corp., 716 P.2d 783, 
785-86 (Utah 1986); Madsen, 658 P.2d at 630; Sears 
v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192, 193-94 (Utah 1977); 
Scarborough v. Granite Sch. Dist., 531 P.2d 480, 482 
(Utah 1975); Lamarrv. Department of Transp., 828 
P.2d 535, 540-42 (Utah App. 1992); Kabwasa v. 
University of Utah, 785 F.Supp. 1445, 1446-47 
(D.Utah 1990). Strict compliance with the notice 
requirement has typically been necessary to maintain 
an action against the State. See Sears, 563 P.2d at 194; 
Scarborough, 531 P.2d at 482. While defects in the 
form or content of notices of claim do not always act to 
bar a claim, see Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 
675 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah 1983); Spencer v. Salt 
Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 362, 363-64, 412 P.2d 449.450 
(1966), courts have consistently barred claims in 
situations where either no notice or only one of the two 
required notices was filed. See Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 
541; Kabwasa, 785 F.Supp. at 1446-47. However, 
until now, no reported Utah decision has barred a claim 
when two notices, free of defects, were timely filed. 
Thus, this appeal presents an issue of first impression 
and necessitates our careful review of the notice of 
claim requirements within the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. See Utah Code Ann.§§ 63-30-11 to -13 
(1993). 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
The Governmental Immunity Act provides that 
[a]ny person having a claim for injury against a 
governmental entity, or against an employee for an 
act or omission occurring during the performance 
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of his duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority shall file written notice of 
claim with the entity before maintaining an action, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise 
to the claim is characterized as governmental.... 
The notice of claim shall be ... directed and 
delivered to the responsible governmental entity 
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 
or 63-30-13. 
A claim against the state, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring during 
the performance of his duties, w ithin the scope of 
employment or under color of authority, is barred 
unless notice of claim is filed with the attorney 
general and the agency concerned within one year 
after the claim arises .... 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11, -12 (1993) 
(emphasis added). 
[5] Under these sections, a plaintiff must give 
timely notice to both the attorney general and "the 
agency concerned" in order to maintain an action 
against the State. Neither party disputes that 
appropriate notice was sent to the attorney general. It 
is also undisputed that notice was sent to the Division 
of Risk Management within one year after the claim 
arose. The trial court found that such notice was 
deficient because it concluded Risk Management was 
not "the agency concerned" within the meaning of 
section 60-30-12. To assess the accuracy of this 
conclusion we must determine what the Legislature, 
*670 in promulgating section 63-30-12, intended to 
include within the term "the agency concerned." (FN3) 
A. Serving Notice on the Agency Concerned 
[6] To interpret a statute, we first examine its plain 
language and will resort to other methods of statutory 
interpretation only if we determine that the language is 
ambiguous. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 
1992); Krauss v. Department of Transp., 852 P.2d 
1014, 1018 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 
(Utah 1993). The State contends that serving notice on 
"the agency concerned" plainly requires serving notice 
on the agency allegedly at fault for the claimant's 
injuries. However, the Legislature chose not to employ 
fault-based terminology into the notice requirement of 
section 63-30-12; instead, it employed the more 
nebulous and far broader language of "the agency 
concerned." If the Legislature had intended to require 
a claimant to serve notice on the agency allegedly at 
fault it would have used different language, perhaps 
requiring that notice be sent to the agency that would 
have been liable if it were a private party. (FN4) 
[7] Moreover, the Legislature's decision to employ 
singular usage and require notice to nthe agency 
concerned* is inconsistent with a fault-based scheme. 
Unlike the imprecise word "concerned," fault is a more 
technical concept and fault is frequently shared by 
multiple parties. If fault were at the heart of 
determining to whom notice should be sent, singular 
usage would be; avoided and the statute would clearly 
require that in cases, like the instant one, where two or 
more agencies are claimed to be at fault, more than two 
notices of claim would be required—one to the attorney 
general and an additional notice of claim to every 
agency which might be at fault. However, the State 
does not contend, nor do the statute or prior cases 
suggest, that more than two notices are ever required. 
(FN5) 
Because the term "agency concerned" is not clear 
on its face, we will interpret the notice requirement of 
section 63-30-12 in a manner consistent with the 
overall purpose of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. As explained by the Utah Supreme Court. "[i]t is 
necessary to (xmsider the policy of the notice 
requirement so 1hat in any particular case the facts can 
be evaluated to determine if the intent of the statute has 
been accomplished." *671 Stahl v. Utah Transit 
Auth., 618 P.2d 480,482 (Utah 1980). 
B. Purpose of Notice 
[8] "[T]he primary purpose of a notice of claim 
requirement is to afford the responsible public 
authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and 
timely investigation of the merits of a claim and to 
arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby 
avoiding the expenditure of public revenue for costly 
and unnecessary litigation." (FN6) Stahl v. Utah 
Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1980). See 
Sears v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192, 193 (Utah 1977); 
Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 362, 364, 412 
P.2d 449, 450 (1966). Serving notice on the attorney 
general is intended to ensure that the State's legal needs 
are met. (FN7) See Lamarr v. Department of 
Transp., 828 P.2d 535, 541 n. 6 (Utah App.1992). 
Furthermore, filing notice of claim tends to minimize 
the difficulties that may arise due to changes in 
administrations. Sears, 563 P.2d at 193. Lastly, the 
requirement thai the notice be in writing protects 
against the passage of time obscuring memory and 
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distorting a plaintiffs recollection of the events which 
are at the heart of the claim. (FN8) See Stahl, 618 
P.2dat482. 
[9] Having ascertained the purposes of the notice 
requirement we next must establish a working 
definition of the term "agency concerned" in order to 
evaluate the adequacy of notice in this case. Because 
the term "agency concerned" is not defined by statute, 
we turn to its commonly understood meaning. The 
word "concerned" is defined as meaning "interested." 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 470 
(1976). Thus, the statute's requirement that plaintiff 
must file notice of claim with "the agency concerned" 
is met by filing notice with any one of potentially 
several agencies with a legitimate interest in plaintiffs 
claim and the legal proceedings which might result 
therefrom. 
ADEQUACY OF NOTICE IN THIS CASE 
[10] We now assess Brittain's contention that the 
notice he filed with Risk Management in this case 
constituted compliance with section 63-30-12 in light 
of both the broad language of that section and the 
aforementioned policy considerations. 
A. Risk Management is Agency Concerned 
The duties of Risk Management mandate it take an 
active role in Brittain's claim and clearly suggest it is 
an agency concerned. To begin with, Risk 
Management is authorized by law to handle Brittain's 
claim, representing the interests of the State. Risk 
Management is empowered with broad-based authority 
to handle claims on behalf of the State. See Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 63A-4-101 to -206 (1993); Utah Admin.Code 
R37-1-1 to -5 (1994). The Legislature has authorized 
Risk Management to "adjust, settle, and pay claims." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63A-4-102(l)(c) *672 (1993). 
Directly relevant to the case at bar, if suit is brought 
against a state agency pursuant to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act the agency shall 
immediately forward to Risk Management any notice 
of claim it receives. Utah Admin.Code R37-1-3(B) 
(1994). The risk manager is also required to supervise 
the state-funded risk management fund. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63A-4-201(l)(a) (1993). This fund is used to 
pay all costs authorized by the risk manager relating to 
property, liability, fidelity and other risks. Id. § 
63A-4-201(l)(b). Moreover, "[i]n managing and 
defending claims against covered entities, the Risk 
Management Fund will consider their interests, but the 
final determination as to claim management defense 
and settlement shall be exclusively with the Risk 
Management Fund." Utah Admin.Code R37-1-1 
(1994) (emphasis added). 
Given this broad-based authority, it cannot be 
seriously argued that Brittain's claim did not directly 
and fundamentally concern Risk Management. On the 
contrary, Risk Management's responsibility and 
involvement were substantial. Therefore, we can only 
conclude that Risk Management had a legitimate 
interest in plaintiffs claim and, by definition, qualified 
as an "agency concerned." 
B. Purpose of Providing Notice was Met 
[11] Moreover, Brittain fulfilled the purposes of 
section 63-30-12 by filing notice of his claim with the 
attorney general and Risk Management. (FN9) 
Considering the duties delegated to Risk Management, 
it appears the state entity entrusted with investigating 
and settling or defending the claim received the 
requisite notice in a timely manner and well within the 
one-year period imposed by the statute. Filing notice 
with Risk Management in no way inhibited the 
possibility of settling the claim without resort to 
litigation. In fact, given the powers and responsibilities 
the Legislature has bestowed upon Risk Management, 
the opposite is true. Filing notice with Risk 
Management facilitated settlement discussions by 
providing notice to the agency responsible for 
investigating and settling the claim and obviated the 
risk that Job Service or DFCM would fail to forward 
the notice to Risk Management as required by law. See 
Utah Admin Code. R37-1-3(B) (1994). Indeed, the 
record indicates that Risk Management actively 
pursued settling Brittain's claim. 
Finally, we wish to reiterate that this is not a case 
where the notice of claim was defective in form or 
content. (FN 10) Recognizing the need for written 
notice to protect against the unreliability of memory, 
the notice of claim was preserved in writing, accurately 
recording Brittain's account of the accident. This is 
also not a case where plaintiff either gave no notice or 
filed only one of the two required notices. (FN11) 
Here, plaintiff filed two *673. notices, one with the 
attorney general and the other with Risk Management. 
Finally, this is not a case where notice of claim was not 
filed within the one-year period. (FN 12) It is 
undisputed that plaintiff sent both notices well within 
one year from the date his claim arose. 
CONCLUSION 
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Given the facts of the case before us and the powers 
the Legislature has bestowed upon Risk Management, 
we conclude that Brittain filed notice of claim on an 
agency concerned by filing notice with Risk 
Management. Therefore, the trial court erred in 
concluding that Brittain failed to comply with section 
63-30-12 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for trial on the 
merits. 
DAVIS and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
(FN1.) This underlying premise has, of course, long 
since been rejected. Indeed, the American 
Revolution resulted from the perception of most 
American colonists that the British sovereign had 
perpetrated any number of wrongs. See The 
Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776). 
(FN2.) A brief recap of how this doctrine evolved can 
be found in Condemarin v. University Hospital 
115 P.2d 348, 349-51 (Utah 1989). 
(FN3.) The State contends that because the current 
version of section 63-30-12 was enacted in 1965 
and went into effect in 1966, the requirement of 
filing notice with the agency concerned could not 
have been meant to refer to Risk Management, 
which was not created until 1981. However, when 
Risk Management was created, the Legislature gave 
it powers and responsibilities that suggest it can 
readily fit within the term "agency concerned" for 
purposes of section 63-30-12. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 63A-4-101 to -206 (1993) (defining powers and 
duties of Risk Management). See also Utah 
Admin.Code R37-1-1 to -5 (1994) (administrative 
rules establishing policies and procedures of Risk 
Management). We should assume that when the 
Legislature created Risk Management it did so 
advisedly, fully aware of the impact this would have 
on existing law. See Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 
530 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1975). See alsoAdkins v. 
Division of State Lands, 719 P.2d 524, 525-26 
(Utah 1986) (holding plaintiff need not file notice 
in accordance with section 63-30-12 because 
Division of State Lands had statutory authority to 
decide dispute prior to the creation and enactment 
of the Governmental Immunity Act). 
(FN4.) See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(1) 
(1993) (providing that "[a] claim [against the 
State] arises when the statute of limitations that 
would apply if the claim were against a private 
person begins to run"). See also Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-4(1 )(b) (1993) (providing that if the State 
waives its immunity from suit "consent to be sued 
is granted, and liability of the entity shall be 
determined as if the entity were a private person"). 
(FN5.) In the instant case, Brittain alleges that the 
Division of Facilities Construction and 
Management (DFCM) was negligent in approving 
the design and construction of the building, and that 
both DFCM and Job Service were negligent in 
maintaining the building and its premises. Thus, 
Brittain claims that while DFCM is responsible for 
creating the dangerous condition, both DFCM and 
Job Service? share the blame for allowing the 
dangerous condition to remain. Under the State's 
fault-oriented view, no reason exists why Brittain 
would not be required to file three notices of 
claim—one with the attorney general, one with the 
DFCM. and one with Job Service. Nonetheless, the 
statute contemplates that only two notices be sent 
and the State does not contend otherwise in this 
appeal. 
(FN6.) In the instant case, this purpose was fully 
accomplished well in advance of any notice being 
given. Within days of this accident, the sovereign's 
agent contacted plaintiff and, with commendable 
responsibility, set about to investigate what 
happened and to settle the claim without need for 
litigation. The main purpose of the statute having 
been met, this appeal is reduced to evaluating 
whether plaintiff has abided by the technical 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act—a statute with which plaintiffs must strictly 
comply in order to overcome the State's immunity. 
(FN7.) The Attorney General has a duty to "defend all 
causes to which the state ... is a party." Utah Code 
Ann. §67-5-l(l)(1993). 
*673_ (FN8.) The Utah Supreme Court has 
previously stated that the notice of claim 
requirement is also intended to provide the State 
with the opportunity to promptly remedy any defect 
before additional injury occurs. See Sears v. 
Southworth, 563 P.2d 192, 193 (Utah 1977). 
However, the plain language of section 63-30-12 is 
contrary to the notion that one of its purposes is to 
allow for prompt remedial measures. Section 
63-30-12 allows one year to file a notice of claim. 
If the Legislature intended to require a notice of 
claim to facilitate the prompt correction of 
potentially dangerous defects or conditions, it 
certainly would have required that plaintiff notify 
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the State of the hazard in a far more expeditious 
manner than anytime within one year of the 
incident. 
For example, in the case before us. Brittain was 
injured on February 4, 1991, when he slipped on 
the ice at Job Service. He had one year to file 
notice of claim with the State. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-12 (1993). The dangerous condition could 
have remained for several more weeks, but in any 
event it would certainly have melted away long 
before the one-year period had expired. 
(FN9.) This court has previously stated "that actual 
notice cannot cure a failure to comply with the 
notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity 
Act." Lamarr v. Department ofTransp., 828 P.2d 
535, 541 (Utah App. 1992). Although not 
expressly stated in Lamarr, the rationale behind 
this rule of strict compliance is clear—the purpose 
of the notice of claim is not simply to provide 
information about the facts of the incident that led 
to the claim being asserted, which facts the affected 
agencies may already know. Instead, the purpose 
of the notice statute is to make the State aware that 
a plaintiff actually intends to assert a claim. Such 
notice allows the State to investigate and settle the 
claim in advance of litigation being commenced. 
Therefore, that Job Service immediately notified 
Risk Management about Brittain's accident and that 
both had actual notice of the incident at the heart of 
Brittain's claim is not dispositive. What matters is 
f Employment Sec., (Utah App. 1994) Page 7 
that Brittain notified Risk Management-the agency 
concerned with investigating and settling or 
defending the asserted claim. 
(FN 10.) See, e.g., Cox v. Utah Mortgage & Loan 
Corp., 716 P.2d 783, 786 (Utah 1986) (letter to 
city council proposing city take legal action not 
sufficient as notice of claim): Scarborough v. 
Granite Sch. Dist., 531 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1975) 
(school principal's submission of written report to 
school district, although based on claimant's 
conversation with principal, did not satisfy notice 
requirement). 
(FNll.) For example, in Lamarr v. Department of 
Transportation, 828 P.2d 535 (Utah App. 1992), 
the defect which barred plaintiffs claim was that 
plaintiff did not file two written notices of claim. In 
Lamarr, plaintiff served UDOT, but failed to serve 
notice of claim on the attorney general. Id. at 
540-41. Likewise, in Kabwasa v. University of 
Utah, 785 F.Supp. 1445, 1446-47 (D.Utah 1990), 
plaintiffs claim was barred because he served only 
one of the two required notices. Finally, in Madsen 
v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 628 (Utah 1983), 
plaintiff failed to file any notice of claim with either 
the attorney general or the agency concerned. 
(FN12.) See Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276, 277 
(Utah 1985) (per curiam); Sears v. Southworth, 
563 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1977). 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Frances SPENCER, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal corporation of the 
State of 
Utah, Defendant and Respondent 
No. 10485. 
March 18, 1966. 
Action to recover from city for injuries sustained 
when plaintiff tripped on a defective sidewalk and fell. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Stewart M. 
Hanson, J., granted city's motion to dismiss claim. 
Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, McDonough, 
J., held that claim against city which gave time, place, 
and stated generally the nature of the alleged defect and 
the injury was not rendered insufficient by its failure to 
state the amount of damages claimed, since city was 
given essential facts enabling it to make proper 
investigation. 
Dismissal vacated and case remanded for trial. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Municipal Corporations ©^755(1) 
268 — 
268X11 Torts 
268XII(C) Defects or Obstructions in Streets 
and Other Public Ways 
268k755 Nature and Grounds of Liability 
268k755(l) In General. 
The city is liable for negligence in performing duty 
of maintenance of streets and sidewalks. U.C.A.1953, 
10-7-77. 
[2] T ime®^8 
378 — 
378k7 Days 
378k8 In General. 
Claim against city filed on July 27 for injuries 
sustained on June 27 when plaintiff tripped on a 
defective sidewalk was filed within 30 days allowed by 
statute governing such suit. U.C.A.1953, 10-7-77. 
[3] Municipal Corporations ®^812(6.1) 
268 — 
268X11 Torts 
268XII(C) Defects or Obstructions in Streets 
and Other Public Ways 
268k810 Actions for Injuries 
268k812 Notice of Claim for Injun 
268k812(6) Form and Sufficiency 
268k812(6.1) In General. 
(Formerly 268k812(6)) 
Claim against city for injuries sustained when 
plaintiff tripped on defective sidewalk and fell, which 
gave time, place, and stated generalh the nature of the 
alleged defect and the injury, was not rendered 
insufficient by its failure to state the amount of 
damages claimed, since city was given the essential 
facts which would enable it to make proper 
investigation. U.C.A.1953, 10-7-77. 
*450 [17 Utah 2d 363 J Thomas A. Duffin, Salt 
Lake City, for appellant. 
Homer Holmgren, City Atty.. A. M. Marsden, Asst. 
City Atty., Salt Lake City, for respondent. 
McDONOUGH, Justice: 
Plaintiff Frances Spencer sued Salt Lake City 
alleging that on the night of June 27. 1964. she suffered 
injuries when she tripped and fell on a defective 
sidewalk where tree roots had raised it about four to six 
inches in front of 463 Douglas Street. 
(1) Our statutes impose upon the City the duty of 
maintenance of streets and sidewalks, and it is 
established that the City is liable for negligence in 
performing this duty; see Nyman v. Cedar City, 12 
Utah 2d 45, 361 P.2d 1114. Section 10-7-77, 
U.C.A.1953 provides that a person must file a claim 
within 30 days after the injury. 
At pre-trial the district court granted the City's 
motion to dismiss on the ground (a) that the plaintiff 
had not filed her claim within 30 days; and (b) that the 
claim which was filed was insufficient in that it did not 
state the amount of damages claimed. 
(2) As to (a), it is alleged that the accident occurred 
on June 27, 1964. The claim is dated July 25, 1964, 
and was filed with the City Recorder on July 27, 1964. 
This is within the 30 days allowed by the statute. 
(3) As to (b): The claim gave the time, place and 
stated generally the nature of the alleged defect and the 
injury. Even if the fact that the amount of damages was 
not stated be regarded as a defect, that [17 Utah 2d 364 
J surely should not be considered as rendering the 
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claim a complete nullity. There is a wide difference 
between presenting no claim at all and presenting one 
of the kind shown here which evidently fulfills the main 
purpose of the statute: of giving the City the essential 
facts as soon as reasonably possible after the injury so 
that it will have ample opportunity to make a proper 
investigation. See Hurley v. Town of Bingham. 63 
Utah 589, 228 P. 213. In such circumstances as this it 
is the duty of the court to look to substance rather than 
to technicality in order that plaintiff may have a fair 
adjudication of her claim. It seems unreasonable and 
captious to deprive her entirety of that opportunity for 
failing to specify the amount of damages she suffered 
within 30 days of her injury when it is obvious that 
neither she nor anyone else would know just what those 
figures were at that time. 
Inasmuch as the plaintiff filed her claim within the 
30 days allowed by statute, and the claim was sufficient 
to constitute substantial *451. compliance with the 
statute and apprise the City of the essentials thereof, it 
is our opinion that the dismissal was in error. It is 
vacated and the case remanded for trial. No costs 
awarded. 
HENRIOD, C. J., and CROCKETT, WADE, and 
CALLISTER. JJ. concur. 
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ORME, Judge: 
11 Great West Casualty Company challenges the 
trial court's grant of the Utah Department of 
Transportation's motion for summary judgment, 
premised on the inadequacy of notice under Utah's 
sovereign immunity scheme. With some reluctance, 
we affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
12 The facts are undisputed. On October 20, 1997, 
Lloyd Morns was driving a truck on Interstate SO 
when he came upon a cow in the highway. He struck 
the cow and rolled the truck. Both Lloyd and his wife 
Judy, a passenger in the vehicle, were injured, and the 
vehicle was damaged. The truck was owned by M&P 
Transportation and insured by Great West Casualty 
Company. Great West compensated M&P for die 
damage done to the truck. 
13 On May 13, 1998, pursuant to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, see Utah Code Ann. 
§§63-30-1 to -38 (1997 & Supp. 2000), Morris filed 
a notice of claim against the Utah Department of 
Transportation (UDOT). See Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-11 (Supp. 2000).l The claim asserted that the 
cow's foray onto the highway resulted from UDOTs 
negligence in maintaining its roadside fence and that 
"[Morris] sustained serious injury to his person as 
well as significant damage to his semi-tractor in this 
collision — The damage to claimant's semi exceeds 
$48,000.00." Neither Great West nor M&P ever filed 
their own notice of claim for the vehicle damage. 
14 UDOT denied Morris's claim, so on February 10, 
1999, Morris and his wife filed a personal injury suit 
against UDOT.2 The complaint was later amended to 
add Great West, which sought to recover from UDOT 
the sum it paid M&P for the vehicle damage. 
J5 On October 8,1999, UDOTmoved for summary 
judgment against Great West, "arguing that threat 
West's failure to file a notice of claim barred it'from 
pursuing a lawsuit 'against UDOT., Great West 
opposed this motion by arguing that the notice of 
claim filed by Mocris was sufficient to put UDOT on 
notice of the property damage claim now being 
asserted by Great West. The trial court granted 
UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment Great West 
appeals.3 . , . '~: -~ .* 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
16 TTxe sole issue on appeal is whether Great West 
can rely upon a timely notice of claim filed by 
Morris, on his own behalf, that identifies the loss 
sustained by Greal West but fails to reference Great 
West as a party to the claim. Summary judgment is 
proper only if there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. See Harward v. Utah County, 2000 UT 
App 222,16, 63 PJd 1140. We review summary 
judgment determinations for correctness, according 
no particular deference to the trial court, and evaluate 
die facts and inferences in the light most favorable to 
the non- moving party. See Tollman v. City of 
Hurricane, 1999 UT 55,11,985 P.2d 892. 
ANALYSIS 
17 Great West argues that Morris's notice of claim 
was legally sufficient to notify UDOT of Great West's 
property damage claim! Relying upon Moreno v. 
Board of Education, 926 P.2d 886 (Utah 1996), Great 
West contends that, as the real party in interest, it 
should be able to "piggyback" on Morris's notice of 
claim for the vehicle damage. 
18 The Governmental Immunity Act requires that 
[a]ny person having a claim for injury against 
a governmental entity, or against its employee 
for an act or omission occurring during the 
performance of the employee's duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority shall file a written notice of claim 
with the entity before maintaining an action 
Utah Gxie Ann. §63-30-11 (2) (Supp. 2000). A notice 
of claim must contain "(i) a brief statement of the 
facts; (ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and (iii) the 
damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are 
known." Id. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a). In addition, the notice 
"shall b e . . . signed by the person making the claim 
or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal 
guardian[.]" Id. §63-30-1 l(3)(b)(i). The notice of 
claim must be filed with both the attorney general and 
the agency concerned within one year after the claim 
arises, or the claim is barred. See id. §63-30-12. See 
also Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36,118, 
977 P.2d 1201 ("Failure to file such notice [of claim] 
deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction."). 
19 Utah courts have held that the notice provisions 
of the Governmental Immunity Act are to be strictly 
construed and that "full compliance with its 
requirements is a condition precedent to the right to 
maintain a suit" Scarborough v. Granite Sch. Dist., 
531 P.2d 480,482 (Utah 1975). In general, even in 
situations where a governmental agency may be given 
actual notice of a party's claim, the party must still file 
a notice of claim in full compliance with the statute in 
order to pursue its claim. See Rushton, 1999 UT 36 at 
119. 
110 However, the Utah Suoreme Court in Mnrenn 
rrovo. Uiafl 
^>* «.«•«. f » W l v^asuauy v. UT Dept. of Transportation 
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did loosen the standard for evaluating the adequacy of 
notices of claim to something less than "strict 
comp!ianceH in certain situations.4 Moreno involved 
the drowning of a boy named Bill in a swimming 
pool owned and operated by Jordan School District. 
See 926 P.2d at 887. Several years before, the 
Morenos were awarded permanent custody and 
guardianship of Bill, but the parental rights of Bill's 
natural mother, Laura Bartlett, were never terminated. 
See id. Following Bill's death, the Morenos filed a 
notice of claim, on (heir own behalf, seeking to 
recover damages for the wrongful death of "their" 
child under Utah Code Ann. §78-11-6 (1996).$ See 
926 P.2d at 887. When the school district denied the 
Morenos' claim, they filed a wrongful death suit in 
district court. See id. 
|11 The school district moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that the Morenos could not 
maintain their wrongful death action because they 
were Bill's guardians, not his heirs. See id. At the 
same time, Bartlett sought to intervene in the action, 
asserting that she was the real party in interest. See id. 
at 887-88. However, Bartlett had never filed a notice 
of claim- timely or otherwise-and the school district 
argued that her failure barred her claim and therefore 
she should not be allowed to intervene. See id. at 888. 
^12 The trial court denied the school district's 
summary judgment motion, ruling that the Morenos 
could bring the action on their own behalf. See id. 
The trial court also denied Bartlett's intervention 
motion, ruling that the Morenos were the real party in 
interest. See id. 
^13 On appeal, the Supreme Court found that 
section 78-11-6 gave the Morenos the right to bring 
a wrongful death action but only "in behalf of the 
ward's heirs," id. at 890, in this case Bill's natural 
mother, Bartlett. See id. at 889-90. Because the 
Morenos had the authority as Bill's guardians to 
maintain an action for his wrongful death, albeit not 
in their own behalf, then "it follows that the guardian 
ha[d] the authority to file the prerequisite notice of 
claim." See id. at 892. 
^14 Despite her failure to file a notice of claim, 
the Supreme Court allowed Bartlett to "piggyback" 
on the Morenos' notice of claim and intervene in the 
action they filed. See id. The Court held that the 
notice of claim was sufficiently in compliance with 
section 63-30-11 for Bartlett to pursue her claim 
despite a clear defect in the notice: it claimed 
damages for the Morenos' loss instead of for Bartlett, 
the legally viable claimant. See id.; Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-1 l(3)(a)(iii) (Supp. 2000) (providing notice 
must state "damages incurred by the claimant so far 
as they are known") (emphasis added). Overlooking 
the technical defect in the notice of claim, the Court 
found that the notice of claim gave the school district 
sufficient notice of all the facts surrounding the claim, 
the nature of the claim, and the amount of damages 
that would be sought—even though the Court noted 
that Bartlett's damages might well be less than those 
sought by the Morenos-and was therefore "legally 
sufficient to support the maintenance of [Bartlett's] 
wrongful death action." Id. 
HI5 As a practical matter, and despite UDOTs 
protestations to the contrary, Moreno undeniably 
served to loosen the strict compliance standard for 
notices of claim in certain citnot^*- 6 u 
as Gnat West argues'jn this appeal, t h e Moreno 
holding turns on one key concept, namely, the 
standing of the party who files the notice of claim. 
Only parties with standing to bring an action can file 
an effective notice of claim. See Moreno, 926 P.2d at 
892. Moreno holds that so long as the filing party had 
standing to bring the suit, and thus had authority to 
file the claim, a third party entitled to all or a portion 
of the same claim may piggyback on the filing party's 
notice of claim and maintain an independent suit 
against the State. This is true even if the notice of 
claim docs not name the third party as a claimant, and 
thus is not in strict compliance with the statute. The 
effect of Moreno is, in essence, to supplant the "strict 
compliance" standard with a standard of "pretty strict 
compliance" in cases of multiple claimants with 
standing to sue on the same claim. 
H16 Morris's notice of claim does not encompass 
Great West's claim and bring it within Moreno's 
safety net because Morris lacked standing to bring a 
suit, and thus to file an effective notice of claim, for 
damage to the vehicle. At oral argument, both sides 
acknowledged that Morris was simply an employee of 
the actual owner of the truck, M&P Transportation, 
and had no colorable claim to recover for damages to 
the vehicle. Morris therefore had no authority to file 
the requisite notice of claim for damage to the truck, 
and neither M&P nor its insurer, Great West, could 
piggyback on Morris's notice of claim, as he had 
standing to pursue only a claim for personal injury.7 
fl 7 Although we are confident this is the correct 
result given controlling case law, the result is 
admittedly somewhat troubling in light of the fact that 
Morris's notice of claim, like the notice of claim in 
Moreno, fulfilled its intended purpose and gave 
UDOT "timely notice" of the property damage claim 
against it so that UDOT could "conduct an 
investigation" to see if the claim had merit. Moreno, 
926 P.2d at 892. Yet, because of Morris's lack of 
standing to pursue a claim for damage to the truck, 
Great West ;s not allowed to rely on the otherwise 
sufficient notice of claim, and UDOT avoids any 
responsibility for the property damage resulting from 
an accident that was allegedly its fault. 
1118 Aside from the niceties of prior case law 
adopting and reiterating a "strict compliance" 
standard found nowhere in the governing statute, if a 
technically deficient notice of claim nonetheless does 
what such a notice is designed to do and provides the 
State with enough information to become aware of 
the incident, conduct an investigation, and make an 
informed decision about its liability, the State should 
not be so quick to hide behind the cloak of "sovereign 
immunity." That doctrine arose when the monarch 
was rather antagonistic to his subjects and wished to 
insulate the treasury from the just claims of the 
peasantry, who were expected to embrace the fiction 
that "the King can do no wrong." We know better 
now, and in modern America, where the state enjoys 
a much more benevolent relationship with its citizens 
and has a more realistic view of its own fallibility, the 
enlightened sovereign should be willing to accept 
responsibility for itsnegligence when the deficiencies 
in a notice of claim do not actually prejudice its 
ability to investigate a claim, evaluate its merit, and 
resolve it in timely fashion. Such an adinctmAnt - *L~ 
of the Legislature and not this court 
CONCLUSION 
J19 The trial court properly granted UDOTs 
motion for summary judgment against Great West 
Even though the standard of "strict compliance" 
concerning notices of claim has been softened in 
some circumstances by Moreno, Great West could not 
rely on Morris's 
notice of claim in light of his lack of standing to 
recover damage to the truck. 
J20 Affirmed. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
121. I CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge 
(concurring): 
122 Unlike the majority, I have no reluctance 
whatsoever in affirming the trial court, and cannot 
agree with my colleagues' broader interpretation of 
Moreno v. Bd. ofEduc, 926 P.2d 886 (Utah 1996). 
123 There is no question here that Great West did 
not file a notice of claim. Thus, only by bootstrapping 
itself onto Morris's notice of claim may Great West 
maintain its lawsuit against UDOT. Accordingly, 
Great West suggests that under the Moreno case, 
Great West may step into Morris's shoes as the real 
party in interest regarding the property damage claim. 
Great West analogizes from Moreno because in that 
case, although the Morenos' notice of claim was filed 
on their own behalf, the supreme court ruled the 
notice was "legally sufficient to support the 
maintenance of this wrongful death action" by the 
child's natural mother. Moreno, 926 P.2d 886, 892 
(Utah 1996) (separate opinion of Howe, J., joined by 
Stewart, Associate C.J., and Durham, J.). The 
supreme court reasoned that M[s]ince [Utah Code Ann. 
§]78-11 -6 authorizes a guardian to maintain an action 
for the wrongful death of his ward, it follows that the 
guardian has the authority to file the prerequisite 
notice of claim. "Id. 
124 The majority's interpretation of Moreno 
accepts the analogy, and seems to stand for the 
proposition that one party's notice of claim would be 
allowed to cover a party who did not file a notice of 
claim when each party has standing to pursue the 
same claim. Nevertheless, the holding in Moreno is 
readily distinguishable from our case. Great West has 
asserted no statutory or other legal basis, as the 
Morenos had, under which Morris was authorized to 
maintain an action or file a notice of claim for Great 
West. Thus, the supreme court in Moreno did not 
articulate a "substantial compliance" standard, but 
rather allowed one party's notice of claim to cover a 
party who did not file a notice of claim only when the 
first party was legally authorized (e.g., by statute) to 
bring a lawsuit on behalf of the second party. See 
Moreno, 926 P.2d at 892. Great West therefore may 
not piggyback on Morris's notice of claim to avoid 
the responsibility of filing its own notice. This 
comports with the case law mandating strict 
compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act's 
notice-of-claim provisions. See Rushton v. Salt Lake 
County, 1999 UT 36,119, 977 P.2d 1201; Moreno, 
926P.2dat891. I 
125 Accordingly, I conclude the trial court 
correctly granted UDOTs motion for summary 
judgment against Great West I would affirm without 
reluctance. 
Norman H. Jackson, Associate Presiding Judge 
1. As a convenience to the reader, and because the 
provisions in effect at the relevant times do not differ 
materially from the provisions currently in effect, we cite to 
the most recent statutory codifications throughout this 
opinion. 
2. In his complaint, Morris did not seek to recover for the 
property damage to the vehicle. 
3. The Morrises have settled their claims with UDOT and 
are no longer involved in the case. 
4. Consideration of the Supreme Court's Moreno decision 
requires some care. Moreno yielded two opinions—Justice 
Russon's lead opinion and Justice Howe's separate opinion. 
The Court unanimously concurred in portions of Justice 
Russon's opinion, and a majority of the Court concurred in 
Justice Howe's opinion. On the issue primarily relevant to 
this case, Justice Russon's lead opinion did not have 
majority support, but his opinion concludes with a helpful 
summation of the majority's position on that same issue. 
While relying solely on portions of the opinions concurred 
in by a majority of the Court, we do not in our citations 
distinguish between Justice Russon's and Justice Howe's 
opinions. 
5. This section states that "a parent or guardian may 
maintain an action for the death or injury of a minor child 
when the injury or death is caused by the wrongful act or 
neglect of another." 
6. Significantly, the rule requiring "strict compliance" with 
the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act 
does not come from the language of the act itself. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§63-30-1 to -38 (1997 & Supp. 2000). Instead, 
the "strict compliance" standard was first applied to Utah's 
Governmental Immunity Act by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480,482 
(Utah 1975). The shift in Moreno from a blanket "strict 
compliance" standard for notices of claim to more of a 
"substantial compliance" standard, at least in certain 
situations, is fully consistent with the more charitable view 
taken in many other jurisdictions, which require only 
substantial compliance with the notice requirements of the 
state's governmental immunity statute. Seet e.g., Brasher v. 
City of Birmingham, 341 So. 2d 137, 138 (Ala. 1976); 
Woodsmall v. Regional Transp. Dist., 800 P.2d 63, 69 
(Colo. 1990) (en banc); Washington v. City of Columbus, 
222 S.E.2d 583, 589 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975); Vermeer v. 
Sneller, 190N.W.2d389,394(Iowa 1971);Carrv. Townof 
Shubuta, 733 So. 2d 261,263 (Miss. 1999). 
7. The result would be different if Morris could have shown 
that he had an interest in the truck supporting a claim for 
some portion of the damage. For example, had Morris been 
leasing the truck, been in a joint venture with M&P, or been 
the owner/operator of the truck, then he would have had 
standing to pursue a claim and thus could have filed an 
effective notice of claim. Even as an employee driving the 
truck, Morris might have had standing if he could have 
shown either that his employment contract with M&P held 
him responsible to pay for damage to the truck or that M&P 
had informed him, after the accident, that they intended to 
hold him responsible for the damage. No such additional 
factor, however, is present in this case. 
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February 11, 1999 
Mr. Stephen R. Crosby 
Kane County Commissioner 
76 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
RE: Claimant: Mary Wheeler & Petra Srbova 
Date of Loss: 09-27-98 
Dear Mr. Crosby: 
Mary Wheeler and Petra Srbova hereby gives notice of claim 
against Kane County. This notice arises out of a motor vehicle 
accident involving Mary Wheeler and Petra Srbova who were 
passengers in a motor vehicle being operated by Dale Wheeler. That 
vehicle struck a vehicle being operated by Kane County employee, 
Mark R. McPherson. The accident, happened on State Road 89 at 
approximately 3/10 of a mile east of milepost 52. 
Both Mary Wheeler and Petra Srbova received serious injuries, 
including soft tissue damage. In addition, Mrs. Wheeler suffered 
a collapsed lung and pneumothorax. Mary Wheeler has incurred 
medical expenses of approximately $8,000 and Petra Srbova has 
incurred medical expenses of approximately $5,000. 
Sincerely yours, 
IVIE & YOUNG 
JCP/jlb 
cc: Utah Association of 
Counties Insurance Mutual 
9814-2J94 
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Ivie and Young 
48 North University Avenue 
Post Office Box 657 
Provo, Utah 84603 
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February 11, 1999 
Mr. Joe C. Judd 
Kane County Commissioner 
76 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
RE: Claimant: Mary Wheeler & Petra Srbova 
Date of Loss: 09-27-98 
Dear Mr. Judd: 
Mary Wheeler and Petra Srbova hereby gives notice of claim 
against Kane County. This notice arises out of a motor vehicle 
accident involving Mary Wheeler and Petra Srbova who were 
passengers in a motor vehicle being operated by Dale Wheeler. That 
vehicle struck a vehicle being operated by Kane County employee, 
Mark R. McPherson. The accident^ happened on State Road 89 at 
approximately 3/10 of a mile east'of milepost 52. 
Both Mary Wheeler and Petra Srbova received serious injuries, 
including soft tissue damage. In addition, Mrs. Wheeler suffered 
a collapsed lung and pneumothorax. Mary Wheeler has incurred 
medical expenses of approximately $8,000 and Petra Srbova has 
incurred medical expenses of approximately $5,000. 
Sincerely yours, 
IVIE & YOUMG 
JEFFERY C. PEATROSS 
JCP/jlb 
cc: Utah Association of 
Counties Insurance Mutual 
9S14-2J94 
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February 11, 1999 
Mr. Norman Carroll 
Kane County Commissioner 
76 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
RE: Claimant: Mary Wheeler & Petra Srbova 
Date of Loss: 09-27-98 
Dear Mr. Carroll: 
Mary Wheeler and Petra Srbova hereby gives notice of claim 
against Kane County. This notice arises out of a motor vehicle 
accident involving Mary Wheeler and Petra Srbova who were 
passengers in a motor vehicle being operated by Dale Wheeler. That 
vehicle struck a vehicle being operated by Kane County employee, 
Mark R. McPherson. The accident happened on State Road 89 at 
approximately 3/10 of a mile east'of milepost 52. 
Both Mary Wheeler and Petra Srbova received serious injuries, 
including soft tissue damage. In addition, Mrs. Wheeler suffered 
a collapsed lung and pneumothorax. Mary Wheeler has incurred 
medical expenses of approximately $8,000 and Petra Srbova has 
incurred medical expenses of approximately $5,000. 
Sincerely yours, 
IVIE & YQUNG_ 
_ _ - JEFFERY C. PEATROSS 
JCP/jlb ' -^" 
cc: Utah Association of 
Counties Insurance Mutual 
9S14-2J94 
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ADDENDUM D 
STERBA AND 
HATHAWAY 
APROFESSIONAL INCORPORATION 
215 SOUTH STATE STREET • SUITE 1150 LINETTE BAILEY HUTTON 
SALT LAKE CITY • UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE: 801 364-8300 
FACSIMILE: 801 364-8355 
March 8,1999 
Jeffery C. Peatross 
IVIE& YOUNG 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 657 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Re: Your Clients: Mary Wheeler & Petra Srbova 
Our Clients: Kane County and Mark R McPherson 
D/Loss: 9-27-98 
Dear Mr. Peatross: 
We are in receipt of your correspondence entitled "Notice of Claim" dated February 11,1999. 
In this document you indicate that your clients have "incurred medical expenses" as a result of a 
motor vehicle accident on the above date. In order for my client to consider such a claim, it is 
necessary that the claimant provide us with some proof of injury, and evidence of medical expenses 
exceeding the PIP limit. Please provide us with these records, or, in the alternative, please provide 
us with the names of the claimants' health care providers and have your clients each sign the enclosed 
medical records releases. 
Please be advised that this does not constitute an acceptance or denial of the "Notice of 
Claim," nor does it confirm or verify the sufficiency of the claimants' notice of claim as required by 
the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 etseq. 
Sincerely, 
STIRBA& HATHAWAY 
LinetteB. Hutton 
LBKjcp 
cc:DougAkr—•— 
Si 
CONSENT TO RELEASE OF MEDICAL RECORDS 
TO: 
I HEREBY authorize and request you to release to STD3BA & HATHAWAY, acoovof 
anv and all records in your possession regarding MARY WHEELER including but not limited to 
laboratory reports and evaluations, nurses' notes and physicians' orders, medications and graphics, 
specialty services, patient evaluations, consultations and correspondence, operating room records, 
admissions and discharge records, progress notes and diagnostic studies, radiology/x-ray reports & 
evaluations, MRI's, and scans, outpatient and/or inpatient records, billing and office notes, history 
and physical report records, emergency room records, and anv additional documents orthings not 
listed above. 
A photocopy of this authorization shall be accepted as granting the same authority as the 
signed original. 
MARY WHEELER 
DOB: 
SSN: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this day of , 1999. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: 
ADDENDUM E 
r%ai i e v*uunzy Muorney's Office 
76 North Main 
Kanab. Utah 84741 
Jeffery C, Peatross 
Ivie and Young 
P. 0. Box 657 
Provo, UT 84603 
REi Mary Wheeler & Petra Srbova 
Dear Mr. Peatross: 
As you are no doubt aware, Kane County has turned the claim ov< 
to its claim adjusters, who have in turn retained Linette B 
Hutton. Please direct all further communications and 
correspondence to Ms. Hutton. Thank you, 
Sincerely, 
Colin R. Winchester 
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
cc: Linette B. Hutton 
Lamont Smith 
